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US Patent Number 7,140,535.
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| United States Patent |
7,140,535
|
|
Sussman
| November 28, 2006 |
Method and system to validate
periodically the visa of a foreign visitor during the
visitor's in-country stay
Abstract
This invention integrates with a country's customs and
immigration system to keep a periodic check on visitors
within the country's borders. A smartcard is created and
issued to the visitor at the visitor's Port of Entry.
Pertinent immigration information is embedded in the
smartcard. Cryptographic technology is used with the
smartcard to maintain privacy, as well as to reduce fraud
and other misuse. The smartcard is used as the visitor's
official identification document whilst in the country.
During the visitor's stay, at specified intervals, the
visitor registers with automated kiosks (i.e. a Visitor-Visa
Automated Teller Machines--ATMs), which are placed at
various locations within the country. The ATM kiosks are
securely integrated with the customs and immigration
database. On exiting the country, the smartcard is returned
and is recycled with a new visitor.
| Inventors:
|
Sussman; Lester
(Bethesda, MD) |
|
Appl. No.:
|
10/771,008 |
| Filed:
|
February 4, 2004 |
| Current
U.S. Class: |
235/375 ; 235/382 |
| Current
International Class: |
G06F
17/00 (20060101); G06K 5/00 (20060101) |
| Field
of Search: |
235/375,487,492
|
References Cited
[Referenced By]
U.S. Patent
Documents
Other References
Ellen Groves, "To Make a Quick I.D., Play it by
Ear", Apr. 12, 2004, p. 92,
Businessweek, USA. cited by other .
Panko, "Basic Error Rates", 1997, pp. 1-3,
http://panko.cba.hawaii.edu/HumanErr/Basic.htm, USA.
cited by other .
USA Nonimmigrant Visa Application, DS-156, pp.
1-2, U.S. Dept. of State, Feb. 2003, USA. cited by
other .
Transaction Team 1500 Brochure, Oct. 2002, pp. 1-2,
HHP, USA. cited by other .
Issues & Elements of Credit Card Receipt & Signature
Management, pp. 1-6, 17, ING@NICO, USA. cited by
other .
Bruce Schneier, One-Way Hash Functions (Chap. 18),
Applied Cryptography (2ed.), 1996, pp. 429-431, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. cited by other .
Bruce Schneier, Public-Key Algorithms (Chap. 19),
Applied Cryptography (2ed.), 1996, pp. 461-462 and
466-474, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. cited by other .
Dept. of Homeland Security, US-VISIT pamphlet,
pp. 1-3. cited by other .
Athena Smartcard Solutions Inc., ASECard Crypto,
2 pages. cited by other .
Athena Smartcard Solutions Inc., ASEDrive IIIe
PC/SC Smart Card Readers, 2 pages. cited by other .
Allsafe Technologies, Magnetic Stripe, 1 page,
Amherst, New York. cited by other .
Tyner, Manual Swipe Magentic Card Low-Co
Reader/Writer RS-232 Interface Details, MSR 106
Series Reader/Writer, 3 pages. cited by other.
|
Primary Examiner: Stcyr; Daniel
Claims
What is claimed:
1. A distributed customs and immigration system for
authorizing a visitor's stay in a country, comprising:
a) a smartcard;
b) a plurality of first computers comprising:
i) a means for capturing a plurality of first
biometric data from said visitor,
ii) a means for entering first textual data,
iii) a means to communicate in a multiplicity of
foreign languages on said first computers, wherein
said visitor selects a preferred visitor language to
communicate with said first computers, from said
multiplicity of languages,
iv) a means to translate said first textual data
from said multiplicity of foreign languages to a
first language used by said visited country, said
translation of said first textual data are second
textual data;
v) a means for storing said first biometric data
and said second textual data on said smartcard;
c) a first computer server remotely located from said
first computers comprising:
i) a first database system,
ii) a plurality of programs for interacting with
said first database system;
d) a first communications network interconnecting
said first computers to said first computer server;
e) wherein said smartcard includes a first unique
identifier;
f) wherein said first computers store said first
biometric data, said first textual data and said second
textual data in said first database system located on
said first computer server system using said first
communications network;
g) wherein said first textual data and said second
textual data include information about said visitor's stay
in said country.
2. The system of claim 1 wherein said smartcard comprising:
a) a cryptographic circuit and memory, said memory
storing said first biometric data and said second
textual data;
b) said first unique identifier visible on face of
said smartcard;
c) a magnetic stripe, wherein said magnetic stripe
storing third textual data, said third textual data
uniquely identifying said smartcard and said visitor;
d) said preferred visitor language selection stored in
said memory.
3. The system of claim 1 wherein said first biometric data
selected from the group consisting of a fingerprint and a
photograph.
4. The system of claim 1 wherein said first communications
network comprising a secure network.
5. The system of claim 1 wherein said first biometric data,
said first textual data and said second textual data stored
in said first database system is accessed using said first
unique identifier.
6. The system of claim 1 wherein said means for entering
first textual data is a touch screen computer display
keyboard.
7. A distributed customs and immigration system for
periodically identifying and validating a visitor's
authorized stay in a country comprising:
a) a smart card;
b) a plurality of first self service computer
terminals comprising:
i) a means for capturing a plurality of first
biometric data from said visitor,
ii) a means for displaying information to said
vistor,
iii) a means for entering first textual data by
said visitor,
iv) a means for storing said first biometric data
and said first textual data on said first self
service terminals,
v) a means to communicate in a multiplicity of
foreign languages on said first self service
computer terminals, wherin said visitor selects a
preferred visitor language to communicate with said
first self service computer terminals from said
multiplicity of languages,
vi) a means to translate said first textual data
from multiplicity of foreign languages to a first
language used in said visited country, said
translation of said first textual data are second
textual data;
c) a first computer server remotely located from said
self service terminals comprising:
i) a first database system,
ii) a plurality of programs for interacting with
said first database system,
iii) a third textual data store in said first
database system, said textual data comprising data
originally entered by said visitor about said
authorized stay in said country;
d) a second communication network interconnecting
said first self service computer terminals to said first
computer server;
e) wherein said first self service computer terminals
transfer said biometric data, said first textual and
said second textual data to said first database system
located on said first computer server using said second
computer communications network;
f) wherein said first textual data and said second
textual data include a change of information about said
visitor's stay in said country, described by said third
textual data comprising data originally entered by said
visitor about said authorized stay in said country; and
g) wherein said first computer server programs compare
said first biometric data received from said first self
service computer terminals with said second biometric data
originally entered by said visitor in an originating
country.
8. The system of claim 7 wherein said smart card comprising:
a) a cryptographic circuit and memory storing said
second biometric data captured from said visitor in an
originating country; and
b) a first unique identifier code visibly imprinted on
said smartcard and stored in said memory.
9. The system of claim 8 wherein said second biometric data
and said third textual data stored in said first database
system and said memory is accessed using said first unique
identifier code.
10. The system of claim 7 wherein said first and said second
biometric data selected from the group consisting of a
fingerprint and a photograph.
11. The system of claim 7 wherein said second communications
network comprising a secure network.
12. The system of claim 11 wherein said second
communications network selected from the group consisting of
X.25, dedicated telecommunication lines, satellite VSAT
network and a virtual private network over the Internet.
13. The system of claim 7 wherein said means for entering
said first textual data is a touch screen computer display
keyboard.
14. A customs and immigration computer method system to
authorize and to periodically identify and validate a
visitor's authorized stay in a country, comprising the steps
of:
a) collecting first biometric data and other first
data from said visitor with a first computer by an
immigration authority;
b) providing means to said visitor to enter said
first data in a preferred visitor language, selected
from a multiplicity of foreign languages from said first
computer;
c) translating said first data entered into said
first computer from said preferred visitor language into
second data, said second data in preferred language of
said country.
d) transferring said first biometric data, said first
data and said second data from said first computer to a
second computer using a first communications network,
said second computer comprising a first database system;
e) storing said first biometric data, said first data
and said second data in said first database system;
f) issuing a smartcard to said visitor, said
smartcard comprising a first unique identifier. said
first biometric data and said second data;
g) instructing said visitor to cheek in with a first
self service computer terminal by a predetermined date,
said first self service computer terminal located in a
plurality of locations in said country;
h) connecting said self service computer terminal to
said first database using a second communications
network;
i) using said smartcard to check in with said first
self service computer terminal;
j) accessing said first database system by said self
service computer terminal, using said first unique
identifier, said first unique identifier read from said
smartcard;
k) validating said visitor by collecting second
biometric data using said first self service computer
terminal, said validating comprising transferring said
second biometric data to said first database system and
comparing said second biometric data with said first
biometric data stored in said first database system;
l) entering changed data from said first data,
storing said changed first data in said first database
system as third data;
m) translating said third data to fourth data, said
fourth data in said preferred language of said country;
o) storing said fourth data in said first database
system;
p) using said smartcard in said country as an
identity document;
q) checking for unusual use of said identity document
in said country using said first database system;
r) returning said smartcard to said immigration authority
at end of said authorized stay in said country.
15. The system of claim 14 wherein said second biometric
data selected from the group consisting of a fingerprint and
a photograph.
16. The system of claim 14 wherein said second
communications network comprising a secure network.
17. The system of claim 14 wherein said second
communications network selected from the group consisting of
X.25, dedicated telecommunication lines, satellite VSAT
network and a virtual private network over the Internet.
18. The system of claim 14 wherein said first biometric data
and said first data stored in said first database system is
accessed using said first unique.
19. The system of claim 14 wherein said identity document
use includes a hotel check-in, an airline travel check-in, a
rail travel check-in, a car rental transaction, a police
vehicle check and a credit card transaction.
20. The system of claim 14 wherein said unusual use of said
identity document in said country includes fraudulent
copying and use of said smartcard.
Drawings
Select the following links to
view the associated figures:
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
This
invention relates to automated teller machines and
smartcards, specifically, this invention relates to an
automated teller machine that is periodically used to
validate a foreign visitor's authorized stay within a
country, each visitor having been issued with a personal
smartcard at the port of entry.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
In January 2004, the US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) implemented a new system at 115 airports and
14 seaports, which is designed to confirm the identity of
arriving foreign visitors. The new system is called the
US-VISIT program, i.e. the United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology. Further information
on the US-VISIT program can be found at
www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVisitRegulation1-5-04.pdf.
Today the primary focus of US-VISIT is on entry. By the
end of 2005, it is planned that entrance and exit procedures
will be phased in at all border entrances in the US.
Currently 30 airports implement the exit portion of the
program.
The US-VISIT uses scanning equipment to
collect biometric identifiers, specifically digital
fingerprints and digital photos of a person's face.
Data collected from foreign visitors is securely stored as
part of a visitor's travel record. Upon exiting the US,
visitors check out at kiosks by scanning their passport or
visa and repeating the fingerprint scan.
The stored
information will be available to authorized officials and
law enforcement agencies and will help verify compliance
with visa and immigration policies. The information, e.g.
the scanned fingerprints, will be checked against a database
of known and suspected terrorists and other undesirables.
A potential problem arises when a visitor overstays his
visa. In the current system, this overstay will be caught if
he exits the country. It is possible that a warrant for his
arrest could be issued because the central database has
detected an overstay. The problem is then locating the
individual. The majority of visitor visas are issued for a
period of six months. Within six months, it is possible for
a visitor to fraudulently change his identity. The invention
proposes to close many of these loop holes.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The invention integrates with a country's
customs and immigration system to periodically validate a
visitor's authorized stay within the country's borders. This
periodic check includes:
The creation and issuing of
a smartcard during the visitor's Port of Entry processing
visit with pertinent immigration information embedded in the
smartcard.
Storing an original copy of the visitor's
immigration (or non-immigration) information in a central
database system--information, that was embedded on the
visitor's smartcard.
Use of cryptographic technology
with the smartcard to reduce fraud and other misuse.
A self-service, automated kiosk/terminal, i.e. a
Visitor-Visa Automated Teller Machine (ATM) with which the
visitor periodically interacts (i.e. checks in) and which is
distributed at various locations within the country.
Integration of an ATM terminal with the customs and
immigration database.
The visitor's check in
periodicity depends upon visitor's visa type and length of
stay in the country.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE
DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the various components of
the present invention's embodiment of a Visitor-Visa
Automated Teller Machine.
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the various processes embodied
by the present invention.
FIG. 3A is a schematic of the front face of the
invention's smartcard.
FIG. 3B is a schematic of the rear face of the
invention's smartcard.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Before
continuing to describe the invention in more detail, we
first consider a quick overview of available cryptography.
1) Cryptography for Verification, Integrity and
Confidentiality
Two key cryptographic
technologies that the preferred embodiment of the invention
uses are public key and conventional cryptography to ensure
three things:
(1.1) To verify the integrity of the
Visitor-Visa ATM 1,
(1.2) Confidentiality of the data
transmitted between the ATM 1 and the central database 2 and
(1.3) That the data has not been altered during either
transmission between the ATM 1 and the central database 2,
as well as not being altered whilst stored on the smartcard
400.
Conventional cryptography is also called secret
key or symmetric key cryptography. The
Data Encryption Standard (DES),
Triple Des and
Message Digest 5 (MD5) are examples of symmetric key
cryptography.
Message digests are the representation
of alphanumeric text in the form of a single string of
digits, created using a one-way hash function. Encrypting a
message digest with a private key creates a digital
signature, which is an electronic means of authentication.
Use of secret keys to encrypt data is much faster than
public key encryption, but the problem of using symmetric
keys is the safe distribution of the keys between
transaction partners, e.g. from a central office to remote
offices where the Visitor-Visa ATM 1 is stationed. This key
distribution is solved using public key cryptography.
Public key cryptography is an asymmetric method that
uses a pair of keys for encryption: a public key that
encrypts data and a private key (i.e. secret key) that
decrypts the data. The public key is openly distributed. The
key's owner keeps the private key secret. The secret key
cannot readily be derived from the public key. Furthermore,
if the key owner digitally signed the data using his private
key, then the signature can be verified using the key
owner's openly distributed public key.
The present
invention uses cryptography to digitally sign the
information stored on the smartcard 400. Public key
cryptography (i.e.
Public Key Infrastructure or PKI) is used to communicate
between a central office and the remotely located ATM 1
machines.
A Digital Certificate is an attachment to
an electronic message used for security purposes. The most
common use of a digital certificate is to verify that a user
sending a message is who she claims to be, and to provide
the receiver with the means to encode a reply. An individual
wishing to send an encrypted message applies for a digital
certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA). The CA issues
an encrypted digital certificate containing the applicant's
public key and a variety of other identification
information. Note that in the preferred embodiment of the
invention, the CA would most probably be an issuing
authority within the government. The CA, in the preferred
embodiment of the invention, makes its own public key
readily available via distribution on a secure network. The
recipient of an encrypted message uses the CA's public key
to decode the digital certificate attached to the message,
verifies it as issued by the CA and then obtains the
sender's public key and identification information held
within the certificate. With this information, the recipient
can send an encrypted reply. The most widely used standard
for digital certificates is X.509.
Various
implementations of cryptography are used in the invention's
preferred embodiment, such as Netscape's
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), the IETF's
OpenPGP,
the
Message Digest 5 (MD5), etc.
Note that because
this invention would be used by the government, any
cryptographic standards that the government uses would be
implemented in the invention. In the US, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology lists government
standards for smartcards on a web site at
smartcard.nist.gov. The Government Smart
Card-Interoperability Specification is freely available from
this web as the "NIST
Interagency Report 6887-2003 edition Version 2.1".
The invention's embodiment relies on cryptography as
described in further detail in the book titled
"Applied Cryptography" (second edition), by Bruce Schneier.
We now consider the various hardware components of the
invention before we discuss the process of the invention and
its use of various components.
2. Visitor-Visa Card
The present invention
includes the creation of an identity card, i.e. the
Visitor-Visa card 400 (see
FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B).
FIG. 3A depicts the front
view of the Visitor-Visa card 400. This card 400 becomes an
ID card for the visitor during the visitor's in-country
stay. The card 400 includes the following features:
(2.1) The card 400 format is similar to a credit card issued
by various banks, etc. The primary reason for this is so
that it can fit easily in a visitor's purse, wallet, etc.
Furthermore, the person is more likely to securely store the
card 400, whilst it's in his possession.
(2.2) A
unique identification number 403 is embossed on the front of
the card 400 (see FIG. 3A), as well as on the rear of the
card (see FIG. 3B). This card identification number 403 is
associated with the visitor's database 2 record.
Technically, it is set up as an alternate database record
key, i.e. the visitor's database record can be accessed by
using this identifier 403.
(2.3) A card logo 402 is
present on the front face of the card to provide easy
identification of the card type, i.e. versus a person's
credit card, etc. This logo can also be implemented as an
anti-fraud measure, e.g. using a hologram picture, etc.
(2.4) Further card type identification information is
provided on the card 400, namely specific card type text
404. In FIG. 3A, the example given is "US-VISIT CARD ID".
This information is available on both sides of the card 400.
This information can be embossed, or printed on the card
400.
(2.5) If the visitor requires assistance, e.g.
locating a Visitor-Visa ATM 1 machine (more about this
later) as depicted in the "Locate Visitor-Visa ATM in City",
block 22 in FIG. 2, the visitor can call the number listed
on the Help line 405, which is listed on the front of the
card 400.
(2.6) The preferred embodiment of the
invention includes a smart integrated circuit, i.e. a
smart-chip 401 on the card 400. This smart-chip 401 is
similar to the technology used in today's smartcards. An
example of a smartcard is the
ASECard Crypto from Athena. This smartcard provides
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) encryption technology to
data stored on the card. The invention uses the smart-chip
401 to store information about the visitor, using encryption
technology to reduce the potential for fraudulent abuse of
the card 400. The ASECard Crypto has up to 3 KB of
non-volatile RAM to store information. As is common with
integrated circuit technology, the size of memory will
increase over time, and hence more data will be able to be
stored in the smart-chip's memory.
(2.7) The
visitor's photo 408 is printed directly onto the front face
of the card 400.
(2.8) Use of the smart-chip 401 on
the card 400 could be replaced by using a magnetic stripe
406, for example, on the rear face of the card (see FIG.
3B), as is used by today's credit cards, etc. Standard
technology on today's magnetic stripe cards has three tracks
on which data can be encoded. The first track allows
seventy-nine (79) alphanumeric characters to be encoded, the
second track allows forty (40) numeric characters to be
encoded, and the third track allows one hundred and seven
(107) numeric characters to be encoded. As can be seen, the
smart-chip 401 allows more data storage on the card 400 than
a magnetic strip 406.
(2.9) The rear face of the card
400 (see FIG. 3B) also includes information 407 that can be
used to return the card 400 if it is lost by a visitor and
found by another person.
3.
Visitor-Visa Automated Teller Machine (ATM)
FIG. 1
depicts a block diagram of the various components of the
invention's Visitor-Visa ATM 1. The Visitor-Visa ATM 1 is
similar to the various ATMs that banks provide their
customers. The invention's Visitor-Visa ATM 1, includes the
following components:
(3.1) A digital camera 3 that
is used to verify the identity of the person using the ATM
machine 1. The resolution (i.e. dpi) of this camera 3 is
similar to the resolution of the digital camera used to
photograph the visitor at the Port of Entry. This is
important in order to compare the original digital image
with the ATM 1 captured digital image.
(3.2) Memory 4
to store both programs that control the ATM 1, as well as
memory to process data received via the various interfaces
of the Visitor-Visa ATM 1.
(3.3) A digital
fingerprint scanner (i.e. reader) 5 that is used to scan in
(i.e. read) the fingerprint to verify the identity of the
person using the ATM 1. The resolution (i.e. dpi) of this
fingerprint scanner 5 is similar to the resolution of the
digital fingerprint scanner used to scan the visitor at the
Port of Entry. This is important in order to compare the
original digital image with the ATM 1 captured digital
image.
(3.4) A processing unit, i.e. a CPU 6 that
controls all the various electronic components of the
Visitor-Visa ATM 1. Note that the Visitor-Visa ATM 1 could
be simply implemented as a standard computer, e.g. a
MS-Windows, or Linux PC, or any other available computer
system.
(3.5) A card scanner (i.e. reader) 7 that
scans (i.e. reads) the Visitor-Visa card 400 that was
initialized during the "Initialization At Port of Entry" 20
process. The card scanner 7 is able to read information
stored in either the card's magnetic stripe 406, and/or the
card's smart-chip 401.
(3.6) A display unit 8 (e.g. a
computer screen) on which to display messages for the
visitor. The preferred embodiment of the invention uses a
touch-screen display. The display 8 is also used to display
an interactive keyboard if information is required to be
entered by the visitor.
(3.7) A network interface 9 is provided so that the
Visitor-Visa ATM 1 can interact over a secure network 10
with the central database 2. The secure network 10 can be
implemented as a private network (e.g. via
X.25, dedicated telecommunication lines, satellite
VSAT network, a wireless network, etc.), a
virtual private network over the Internet, etc.
(3.8) A printer 11 is available to print any messages,
directions, and other information out on a piece of paper 12
for the visitor to take away with him.
Other
components not shown in FIG. 1 include a visible marker
(e.g. markers in the shape of footprints) on the ground on
which the visitor is to stand in order to be within the
focal length of the digital camera 3. Although not used in
the preferred embodiment, it is possible to include a
component in the Visitor-Visa ATM 1 that can electronically
measure the height and/or weight of the visitor and process
the information accordingly.
Each Visitor-Visa ATM 1
has a unique Digital Certificate embedded in its memory 4
(not depicted in FIG. 1). This certificate is used to
uniquely identify the ATM 1, used in secure communications
with the central database 2 (e.g. via SSL), as well as being
used to encode any information for transmission. The digital
certificate is used similarly as a digital certificate is
used in electronic commerce (e-commerce) on the Internet
today.
Furthermore, the public-key that was used to issue the
smartcard 400 at the Port of Entry is stored in memory 4 as
well. This public-key (or set of public keys from various
Ports of Entry, each with their own unique public key) is
used to verify the digital signature stored on the smartcard
400.
4. Visitor-Visa Process
4.1) Initialization at Port of
Entry--Block 20 in FIG. 2
In FIG. 2, a flow chart
depicts the process of the current invention. The process
starts with the "Initialization At Port of Entry", block 20
in FIG. 2.
This initial step (i.e. visitor registration) in the
process includes the digital photographing and
fingerprinting of the visitor. The information is gathered
by various customs and immigration personnel at the Port of
Entry, using a computer/workstation. This information is
stored 100 by each computer/workstation in a central
database 2, which is remotely located from each of the
computers/workstations. The central database 2 is securely
networked to each of the computers/workstations. The central
database 2 is controlled by a server computer (not shown in
diagrams), and a variety of software running on the server.
At this time, the invention creates the visitor's
Visitor-Visa Card 400. The purpose of the Visitor-Visa Card
400 is similar to the use of a state driver's license in the
US, i.e. a means of identification. Today the visitor
primarily has his passport as a means of identification.
In the preferred embodiment of the invention, the
visitor's photo 408 is directly printed onto the front face
of the card 400. This makes the card 400 representative of a
foreign visitor's in-country id document. Note that it is
possible to embed the visitor's date of entry (see Table 1,
item [2]) in the photo. This feature would help simplify the
visual validation of the visitor's authorized stay in the
country.
Table 1 illustrates the data stored on this
card 400, when using the smart-chip 401. This information is
also stored (see "Log Visit in Central Database", block 100
in FIG. 2, via the on-page connector "60") in the central
database 2.
TABLE 1
| |
| 1) |
Last Name, Middle |
Visitor's full name. Initial[s], First Name |
| 2) |
Date of Entry Date |
(e.g., MM/DD/YY) on which the card was created
and issued at the Port of Entry. |
| 3) |
Visitor-Visa Card Number |
This unique identification number 403 is
embossed on the front of the card 400, as well as on
the rear of the card (see FIG. 3B). This card
identification number 403 is associated with the
visitor's database 2 record. This number is also
stored on the card's smart-chip 401 memory and/or
magnetic stripe 406. |
| 4) |
Length of Stay |
Authorized length of stay in country. For
example, a B2 visa could have a six-month stay. |
| 5) |
Visa Type |
Visa classification, e.g. B2, H1-B, J1, M1, etc.
This data could be encrypted to be used only by
authorized personnel. |
| 6) |
Digital Photo |
Copy of digital photo. |
| 7) |
Height |
Self-explanatory. |
| 8) |
Color of Eyes |
Self-explanatory. |
| 9) |
Color of Hair |
Self-explanatory. |
| 10) |
Language(s) |
Visitor's language of preference, as well as
others that the visitor understands. This language
will be used on the display unit 8 of the ATM 1 when
the visitor interacts. |
| 11) |
Other Data |
Other data needed for the visa checking process,
e.g. Port of Entry code, Country of Origin,
Residential Address, Residential Phone Number,
visitor's weight, etc. |
| 12) |
Digital Fingerprint |
Copy of scanned digital (encrypted) fingerprint.
Encrypted to be used only by authorized personnel. |
| 13) |
Digital Signature |
Digital signature of the above information
(e.g., [1] to [11]) to prevent fraudulent change of
information. |
Other information could also be gathered at this
time, e.g. the person's weight could be entered by having
the visitor unobtrusively be standing on a weight scale when
being fingerprinted, etc. This information would be stored
in the central database 2, i.e. in Table 1, "Other Data".
Referring to Table 1, some of the
information is encrypted to prevent unauthorized viewing of
the specific information. The invention does not prevent the
encrypting of other, or all of the information. The primary
purpose of the card 400 is for use of the identification of
the visitor, as well as ensuring that the visitor does not
overstay his visit in the country.
The primary reason
that most of the information is not encrypted is so that the
Visitor-Visa card 400 can be used as an in-country
identification document for the visitor.
In the case
where the smart-chip 401 is not used, e.g. because of
implementation costs, etc., then the magnetic stripe 406
would be used. Unfortunately, today the magnetic strip 406
cannot store all of the information as described in Table 1
(see section "1] Visitor-Visa Card", sub-section [1.7]). In
this case, only the Visitor-Visa Card Number (Table
1, item [3]) and the Digital Signature (Table
1, item [12]) is stored in the magnetic stripe 406. Note
that the Digital Signature is created at the Port of Entry
based on all of the pertinent information depicted in Table
1, which could be stored in a smart-chip 401, if one was
used. Later for validation purposes, the Digital Signature
is centrally validated against the original data.
The
actual location of where the card's data is gathered,
encrypted and digitally signed needs further explanation.
Bearing in mind that PKI cryptography is used in the
preferred embodiment of the invention, this means that
careful consideration needs to be given to the availability
of the authorities private key. The private key is used to
encrypt data, as well as to create the above-mentioned
Digital Signature (see Table 1, item
[13]). We now consider the following possible
implementations (where encryption implies both data
encryption, as well as creating the data's digital
signature) at the Port of Entry--listed by decreasing risk
of potential abuse:
4.1.1) Encryption at each
immigration personnel's computer/workstation. This would
require a copy of the private key to be distributed to every
immigration personnel's computer/workstation. The risk for
misuse is highest in this scenario. Each immigration
personnel's computer/workstation would have to be
sufficiently powerful enough to handle the encryption
process in a relatively short period.
4.1.2)
Encryption at a central computer server located in each Port
of Entry, which serves the multiple immigration personnel
computers/workstations (see [4.1.1] above). This would
require a copy of the private key to be distributed to every
central computer server located in each Port of Entry. The
risk for misuse is relatively high in this scenario, but
much lower than in case [4.1.1] above. The misuse risk can
be mitigated by strict control of access to the Port of
Entry's central computer server. Furthermore, the Port of
Entry's central computer server processing power would have
to be much larger than the above mentioned scenario, because
of the aggregation of processing for multiple immigration
personnel computers/workstations at the Port of Entry. The
immigration personnel computers/workstations would have to
be securely networked to the Port of Entry's central
computer server.
4.1.3) Encryption at a central
computer server located in each region of the customs and
immigration service, which serve multiple Ports of Entry
(see [4.1.2] above). This would require a copy of the
private key to be distributed to every central computer
server located in each service region. The risk for misuse
is much lower in this scenario, than in both of the above
cases (see [4.1.1] and [4.1.2] above). The misuse risk can
be mitigated further by strict control of access to the
service region's central computer server. The problem in
this scenario is that the card 400 data (i.e.
Table 1) would have to be sent to the service region's
central computer server for encryption, etc. This would
require a highly available and secure communications network
between the various Ports of Entry and the service region's
central computer server. Furthermore, the service region's
central computer server processing power would have to be
much larger than the above mentioned scenarios, because of
the aggregation of processing for multiple Ports of Entry.
4.1.4) Encryption at a central computer server located in
single location of the customs and immigration service,
which serves multiple service regions (see [4.1.3] above).
This would require a single copy of the private key to be
distributed on the single central computer server. The risk
for misuse is lowest in this scenario, compared to all of
the above cases. The misuse risk can be mitigated further by
strict control of access to the single central computer
server. The problem in this scenario is that the card 400
data (i.e. Table 1) would have to be sent to the single
central computer server for encryption, etc. from all of the
immigration personnel computers/workstations, from all over
the country. This would require a highly available; secure
communications network, and relatively large bandwidth,
between the various Ports of Entry and the single central
computer server. Furthermore, the service region's central
computer server processing power would have to be much
larger than all of the above mentioned scenarios, because of
the aggregation of processing for all Ports of Entry. The
single central computer server could be a supercomputer, a
mainframe computer, or a cluster of mainframe computers, or
a cluster of mid-size computers, etc.
The preferred
embodiment implements option [4.1.3] above, i.e. encryption
at a central computer server located in each region of the
customs and immigration service, which serve multiple Ports
of Entry. The card 400 data is transferred to the service
region's central computer server, pertinently encrypted and
digitally signed (i.e. created in "cryptographic state"),
and then the data are returned in the cryptographic state to
the immigration personnel's computer/workstation in order
for a card 400 to be created and issued.
The finished
card 400 product is preferably issued to the visitor at the
point of entry, i.e. where all of the biometric data is
gathered, etc. by the immigration official's workstation.
Unfortunately because the process to print, load pertinent
data into the card 400, as well as registering the data with
the central database 2, could take many minutes of time, it
may be better to issue the card 400 to the visitor at
another point in the customs and immigration process. One
possible point could be the customs checkpoint at the Port
of Entry. All visitors to a country first pass through the
immigration process. They then collect their luggage and
proceed to customs. It usually takes more than twenty
minutes for the luggage to appear. Consequently, this
invention proposes to use the customs checkpoint to issue,
i.e. hand over, each visitor's card 400.
Once the
visitor has been cleared by the customs and immigration
officials, he enters the country with his Visitor-Visa Card
400 in-hand. An explanation is given to the visitor, e.g.
via a pamphlet, regarding the use and relevance of the card
400.
4.2) Losing a
Visitor-Visa Card
If the card 400 is lost, then
the visitor must immediately report its loss and go to the
nearest immigration office to generate a new card 400. In
this process, the visitor would have to pay for a new card
400. At the time that the loss is reported, the central
database 2 would be updated that the card 400 is no longer
valid, i.e. the Visitor-Visa Card Number 403 is invalid and
the visitor is scheduled to obtain a new card 400.
The visitor would be photographed and fingerprinted again,
as he originally was at the Port of Entry (block 20 in
FIG. 2). The visitor's new digital photo and fingerprint
images are first compared with those stored in the central
database 2, that were inputted during the process of
"Initialization At Port of Entry" (block 20 in FIG. 2). If
the images match, then a new card 400 is generated for the
visitor and his central database 2 record is updated. Note
that the originally issued card's identification data
remains in the central database 2, but is tagged as "lost".
The reason for this is in the advent that the stolen card is
fraudulently used, it can be detected and the thief
apprehended. If the card 400 is returned, the database 2 is
updated, but a record is still kept of the card 400 theft in
case fraudulent use is made of the data on the card 400.
Sometimes it may be feasible to simply retire the stolen
card 400 from circulation, even if it is returned to
authorities.
4.3) Time to
Check in--Block 21 in FIG. 2
At some
predetermined time interval, e.g. every month from the date
of arrival in the country, the visitor must check-in at a
local immigration office, or at a place, that has a
Visitor-Visa ATM 1 available. As mentioned previously, the
visitor can use the phone contact information 405 that is
printed on the front face of the card 400 to locate where
the nearest ATM 1 is located.
Although not
illustrated, the preferred embodiment of the invention uses
a common telecommunications technique, which is based on a
telephone's caller-id. The number that the visitor dials,
per the contact phone number 405, is implemented using an
Interactive Voice Response (IVR)
computer system. Firstly, the visitor is prompted to enter
his card identification number 403 using the keypad on the
phone. The number 403 is used to access the central database
2 to find out what is the visitor's preferred language, or
languages. This language is then used to issue all further
instructions, etc.
The IVR computer recognizes from
where the call is placed, and if the appropriate menu option
is selected (e.g. "Where is the nearest ATM location?"), the
system tells the visitor where the nearest Visitor-Visa ATM
1 is located.
The preferred embodiment provides this information via
the Internet as well (e.g. on a web site, which is not
illustrated). This step in the process is illustrated by the
"Locate Visitor-Visa ATM in City", block 22 in FIG. 2.
Note that it is preferable for the ATM 1 to be in a
secure location to prevent vandalism and other abuses of the
system. Examples of such locations are as follows:
(4.3.1) Local government offices, e.g. immigration office,
etc.
(4.3.2) Select local police stations that are
located in public areas.
(4.3.3) College campus
police stations.
(4.3.4) Airport locations, e.g. monitored by the US
Transportation Security Administration.
The visitor
then goes to the nearest Visitor-Visa ATM 1 and takes his
Visitor-Visa card 400 along with him. Note that at this
stage the visitor does not need his passport and hence can
leave it stored securely at his hotel, etc.
4.4) Check in with
Visitor-Visa ATM--Block 23 in FIG. 2
Before
continuing with the detailed description of this step in the
process, a note needs to be made regarding the various data
storage implementation methods of the Visitor-Visa card 400,
as mentioned above in the section titled "4.1)
Initialization At Port of Entry". In this section, it was
mentioned that identification information about the visitor
(i.e. Table 1) is stored in one of two technologies, i.e. a
smart-chip 401 and/or a magnetic stripe 406. Because of the
previously mentioned physical data storage limitations of
the magnetic stripe 406, the preferred embodiment of the
invention implements data storage on the card 400 in a
smart-chip 401.
On the other hand, if a smart-chip
401 implementation is not used, then this information would
be retrieved from the central database 2. This is done by
retrieving the visitor's record in the central database 2,
using the secure network 10 and the card identification
number 403. This record contains the original copy of all of
the pertinent identification information about the visitor
that is listed in Table 1.
After locating the nearest Visitor-Visa ATM 1, the foreign
visitor approaches the ATM 1 with his Visitor-Visa Card 400
in-hand.
Note that the Visitor-Visa ATM 1 could be
monitored by video cameras to deter vandalism, etc.
The ATM 1 has markings (not illustrated in
FIG. 1)
as to where the person needs to stand in order to appear
correctly within the focal length of the Visitor-Visa ATM's
digital camera 3. The person then enters his card 400 into
the ATM's card scanner 7.
The data retrieved from the
visitor's card 400 is temporarily stored in the ATM's memory
4 for processing purposes, as well as along with the date
and time of the transaction, as well as the geographic
location of the Visitor-Visa ATM 1. Note that the geographic
location of the Visitor-Visa ATM 1 could simply be
implemented as a device id, which the central database 2
then translates into the known geographic location.
The ATM's CPU 6 next verifies that the visitor's card 400
has a valid digital signature (see
Table 1, item [13]). If the digital signature is
invalid, then the CPU 6 notes this information as part of
the temporarily stored data record of the visitor in memory
4. The reason for this is that further validation of the
person's identity is required, i.e. via a digital
fingerprint scan and a digital photo.
Note that at no
time does the invention forewarn the visitor of any
problems. The reason for this is not to alarm the visitor
before more data is gathered, etc.
The ATM 1
retrieves the language (See Table 1,
item [10]) in which the visitor prefers to communicate.
The CPU 6 retrieves the relevant language menus that are
pre-stored in the ATM's memory 4. The reason for this is
obvious, i.e. to minimize any potential communications
problems with the visitor regarding any conveyed
instructions, etc. Note that it is possible for the
invention to simply store in memory 4, say the English menu
system, and then to programmatically translate to the
visitor's preferred language. The preferred embodiment of
the invention uses the simpler method of pre-storing menus
in all of the accepted foreign languages. This reduces the
need and expense for today's relatively sophisticated
language translation software to be embedded in the ATM 1.
The first message to appear on the ATM's display 8 is for
the visitor to remove any headgear, sunglasses, etc. that
could interfere with the facial identification of the
person. Next, the person is informed that a photo will be
taken. Preferably, a countdown indicator is displayed on the
display 8 informing the visitor of the imminent photo
taking.
After the digital photo has been taken, then
the visitor is prompted via the ATM's display 8 to place his
pertinent finger on the surface of the digital fingerprint
scanner 5. His fingerprint is digitally scanned in and
temporarily stored in memory 4.
For the casual
visitor to the country, this would suffice for the check-in
process. On the other hand, if the visitor is say a student,
then other information could be asked to be verified by the
visitor, for example, the visitor's current residential
address, place of study, etc. (i.e. in "Other Data", Table
1). If any information has changed, a touch-screen keyboard
is displayed on the display 8, and the visitor is prompted
to enter the correct information. Other examples of
longer-term foreign visitors are temporary workers, visiting
academics, political refugees, etc.
Once the visitor
has submitted all of his required information, the visitor's
temporary data record stored in the ATM's memory 4, is sent
to the central database 2, via a secure network 10. In FIG.
2, this step in the process is identified as "Log Visit in
Central Database", block 101.
A program at the central database 2 then processes the
received information by comparing all the pertinent data
(see Table 1) with a copy of the visitor's identification
data (i.e. in Table 1), which was originally stored in the
central database 2 at the time that the visitor's card 400
was created and issued.
The next step in the check in
process is depicted in block 25 in FIG. 2, i.e. the "All's
Well?" symbol. The following scenarios are possible:
4.4.1) If a problem is encountered, e.g., the visitor's
digital fingerprint does not match the original fingerprint
that was scanned in at the Port of Entry, then a pertinent
anomaly message is returned to the Visitor-Visa ATM 1. The
ATM 1 then informs the visitor via the display unit 8, that
he needs to visit, in person, the nearest Customs and
Immigration office within a specified time-period. This step
is depicted by the "Visit Visitor-Visa Office", block 80 in
FIG. 2.
The Visitor-Visa office location is displayed to the visitor
on the display 8, and the ATM's integrated printer 11 prints
the location and the specified time-period out for the
visitor on a piece of paper 12. The visitor's central
database 2 record is tagged as problematic, with the
appropriate code, as well as any other pertinent data.
4.4.2) On the other hand, it is possible that authorities
have tagged the visitor's central database 2 record as "need
to apprehend". In this case, a message is communicated to
the nearest law enforcement authorities to proceed
immediately to the location of visitor's ATM 1 location.
Another message code is transmitted to the Visitor-Visa ATM
1 to stall the person. The stall process could entail asking
many other seemingly related questions, as well as
displaying other information. Once again, the visitor's
central database 2 record is tagged as problematic, with the
appropriate code, as well as any other pertinent data.
4.4.3) For most visitors, no problems would be encountered.
The Visitor-Visa ATM 1 would then calculate when the visitor
next needs to check in, provided he does not leave the
country prior to the calculated date. As mentioned
previously above, this information is displayed to the
visitor on the display unit 8, and if a printer is
available, a note 12 is printed for the visitor in his
preferred language (see Table 1, item
[10]).
Other possible "All's Well?" scenarios could exist, and
even though they are not described here, they are not
excluded from the present invention.
4.5) Data Mining of the Central
Database
The information stored in the central
database 2, including the check-in events of the foreign
visitor, can be searched (i.e. mined) by various authorized
computer programs. We now consider a number of these
processes:
(4.5.1) Check for Unusual Behavior--Block 201 in FIG. 2:
A computer program 201 runs constantly checking for unusual
behavior 200 patterns in the data collected in the central
database 2. Unusual behavior would simply imply searching
for anomalies such as fraudulent use of a particular
Visitor-Visa Card 400, or a visitor's overstay. In the fraud
case, it could be that a person simply copied all the
information from one card 400 to another card. This behavior
could be detected on a number of levels:
a. The same
Visitor-Visa Card Number 403 is present on the smart-chips
of both Visitor-Visa cards.
b. The encrypted digital
images (i.e. fingerprint and/or photo) that is stored in the
central database 2 is not the same as that captured at check
in time by the ATM's digital camera 3, or digital
fingerprint scanner 5.
Common fraudulent document
detection methods would apply to this program 201, but are
not explicitly discussed here.
Other uses 300 (see
FIG. 2) of the central database 2 by authorized parties
include:
(4.5.2) If the visitor were pulled over by
police 301 (see FIG. 2), say for speeding, then the police
officer would scan 399 the visitor's Visitor-Visa card 400
on equipment supplied to the police authorities (not shown
in FIG. 2). The visitor's information would then be logged
and checked 102 in the central database 2. If any anomaly is
discovered, or the visitor's central database 2 record has
been tagged, the police officer can take the appropriate
action.
(4.5.3) The Visitor-Visa card 400 check in
process could be modified and used in other circumstances
during the visitor's visit. For example, the card 400 can be
scanned whenever the visitor checks into a hotel, or rents a
car, or travels by rail, etc. (see block 302 in FIG. 2).
Supplying this information could help in various ways,
including for routine crime reduction. An example of routine
crime reduction could be in the advent that a visitor's
wallet was stolen in which his credit cards and
identification documents were located. The visitor would
report the theft to the relevant authorities, including the
Visitor-Visa card 400 authorities (see above section titled
"Losing a Visitor-Visa Card"). The thief would then have to
use the Visitor-Visa card 400 whenever he'd use, e.g. a
credit card within the country. This process would need the
possible process modification by the credit card companies,
such that if a credit card is used, and the number belongs
to an overseas visitor, then the visitor's Visitor-Visa card
400 would have to be scanned as well.
4.6) Check Out at Port of Exit--Block 110 in FIG.
2
When the visitor is ready to leave the country, he
needs to check in one last time with a Visitor-Visa ATM 1.
This time, the ATM 1 is located within the exit process
implemented by the country's customs and immigration
authorities, i.e. at the Port of Exit (e.g. at airports,
seaports, etc.).
The check out process is similar to
that outlined in the above section titled "Check In With
Visitor-Visa ATM" (Block 23 in FIG. 2), with the following
exception: the visitor's card 400 is "swallowed" by the
Visitor-Visa ATM 1, i.e. it is not returned to the visitor.
This card 400 "swallow" process does not apply to certain
visa types, i.e. types that are authorized for long-term
stay in the country and have not overstayed permitted time
in the country. In the US, examples of these visa types
include:
A visa -- Diplomatic and other government officials, and
their families and employees.
G visa -- Representatives to international organizations
and their families and employees.
J visas -- Exchange Visitors and their families.
H-1B visas--Persons in a specialty occupation, which
requires the theoretical and practical application of a body
of highly specialized knowledge requiring completion of a
specific course of higher education.
L visas--Intra-company transferees who, within the three
preceding years, have been employed abroad continuously for
one year, and who will be employed by a branch, parent,
affiliate, or subsidiary of that same employer in the U.S.
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge
capacity.
I551--US permanent residents, i.e. "green card" holders.
Numerous other immigrant and non-immigrant visa
classifications apply as well, but are not listed here.
The visitor's central database 2 record is updated
accordingly.
At check out, the visitor's central
database 2 record is checked for any anomalies before the
visitor is allowed to exit the country.
Once the card
400 has been returned to the authorities at check out, the
visitor related data on the card 400 is erased and it is now
available to be reused with a new visitor entering the
country.
In the case where the card 400 is not
"swallowed", on re-entry to the country, the cardholder goes
through a similar process as to the one detailed in the
section titled "Check In With Visitor-Visa ATM" (Block 23 in
FIG. 2). The difference in this case is that the check-in
process is via the immigration authority at a Port of Entry.
The same validation tasks are undertaken to ensure that the
cardholder is correctly listed in the database 2.
* * * * *
