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US Patent Number 7,118,027 .
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| United States Patent |
7,118,027
|
|
Sussman
|
October 10, 2006
|
Method and system issue an
electronic visa of a foreign visitor at a country's foreign
consular premises
Abstract
This invention integrates with a country's customs and
immigration system to issue an electronic visitor's visa,
and to validate periodically, electronically a visitor's
visa within the country's borders. A computer-encoded visa
card is created and issued to the visitor at the country's
overseas consulate. Pertinent visa application information
is embedded in the issued card. Cryptographic technology is
used with the card to maintain privacy, as well as to reduce
fraud and other misuse. The card is used as the visitor's
official identification document whilst in the country.
During the visitor's stay, at specified intervals, the
visitor registers with self-service kiosks, which are placed
at various locations within the country. The kiosks are
securely integrated with the customs and immigration
database.
| Inventors: |
Sussman; Lester (Bethesda, MD) |
|
Appl. No.:
|
10/841,863 |
| Filed:
|
May 10, 2004 |
| Current U.S. Class: |
235/375 ; 235/382 |
| Current International Class: |
G06F 17/00 (20060101); G06K
5/00 (20060101) |
| Field of Search: |
235/375,487,492
|
References Cited
[Referenced By]
U.S. Patent Documents
Other References
Ellen Groves, "To Make A Quick I.D., Play It By Ear",
Apr. 12, 2004, p. 92, Businessweek, USA. cited by
other .
Panko, "Basic Error Rates", 1997, pp. 1-3,
http://panko.cba.hawaii.edu/HumanErr/Basic.htm,
USA. cited by other .
USA Nonimmigrant Visa Application, DS-156, pp. 1-2, U.S.
Dept. of State, Feb. 2003, USA. cited by other .
Transaction Team 1500 Brochure, Oct. 2002, pp.
1-2, HHP, USA. cited by other .
Issues & Elements of Credit Card Receipt &
Signature Management, pp. 1-6, 17, ING@NICO, USA. cited
by other.
|
Primary Examiner:
St Cyr; Daniel
Parent Case Text
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
This is a continuation-in-part of
U.S.
application Ser. No. 10/771,008, filed on Feb. 4, 2004.
Claims
What is claimed:
1. A distributed immigration and
non-immigration visa issuing and validation system for a
visitor's visa application to visit, study or work in a
visited country, comprising:
a) a computer encoded card;
b) a plurality of first computers comprising:
i) a means for capturing a plurality of first
biometric data from said visitor, said plurality of
biometric data including a facial photograph of said
visitor,
ii) a means for entering first textual data,
iii) a means for storing said first biometric
data and said first textual data on said computer
encoded card;
iv) a means to communicate in a multiplicity of
foreign languages on said first computers, wherein
said visitor selects a language to communicate with
said first computers from said multiplicity of
languages;
v) a means to translate said first textual data
from said multiplicity of foreign languages to a
language used by said visited country, said
translation of said first textual data are second
textual data;
c) a first computer server remotely located from said
first computers comprising:
i) a first database system,
ii) a plurality of programs for interacting with
said first database system;
d) a first communications network interconnecting
said first computers to said first computer server;
e) wherein said computer encoded card includes a
first unique identifier;
f) wherein said first computers store said first
biometric data, said first textual data and said second
textual data in said first database system located on
said first computer server system using said first
communications network;
g) wherein said first textual data and said second
textual data includes information about said visitor's
stay in said visited country and additional data.
2. The system of claim 1 wherein said first biometric
data selected from the group consisting of a fingerprint, a
photograph and a retina scan.
3. The system of claim 1 wherein said computer
encoded card comprising:
a) a memory, said memory storing said first biometric
data, said first textual data and said second textual
data;
b) said first unique identifier visible on face of
said computer encoded card;
c) said facial photograph printed on face of said
computer encoded card;
d) a magnetic stripe, wherein said magnetic stripe
storing third textual data, said third textual data
uniquely identifying said computer encoded card and said
visitor;
e) other descriptive and contact information visible
on face of said computer encoded card.
4. The system of claim 1 wherein said first
communications network comprising a secure network, wherein
said secure network selected from the group consisting of
X.25, dedicated telecommunication lines, satellite VSAT
network and a virtual private network over the Internet.
5. The system of claim 1 wherein said first biometric data,
said first textual data and said second textual data stored
in said first database system is accessed using said first
unique identifier.
6. The system of claim 1 wherein said first computer
selected from the group consisting of a computer terminal, a
personal computer and a self-service computer kiosk.
7. The system of claim 1 wherein said first database
system residing in said visited country.
8. The system of claim 1 wherein said computer
encoded card selected from the group consisting of a
smartcard and a laser card.
9. The system of claim 1 wherein said means for
entering said first textual data comprises a keyboard
displayed on said first computer screen in one of said
multiplicity of foreign languages, selected by said visitor,
said first computer screen comprising a touch-screen input
means.
10. A distributed immigration and non-immigration visa issuing and
validation system for a visitor's visa application to visit,
study or work in a visited country, comprising the steps of:
a) collecting first biometric data and additional
first data from said visitor with a first computer by a
visa issuing authority in a foreign country;
b) said first data collected in a first language
selected by said visitor from a multiplicity of foreign
languages used to communicate with said first computer,
and said first data translated into a common language
used by said visited country from said first language by
said first computer, said translated language data are
translated second textual data;
c) transferring said first biometric data, said
additional first data and said translated second textual
data from said first computer to a second computer using
a first communications network, said second computer
comprising a first database system, said first database
system residing in said visited country;
d) storing said first biometric data, said additional
first data and said translated second textual data in
said first database system;
e) validating said first biometric data using a
multiplicity of watch-list databases;
f) validating said other first data and said
translated second textual data;
g) issuing a computer encoded card to said visitor,
provided said validating steps are approved by said visa
issuing authority, said computer encoded card comprising
a first unique identifier, said first biometric data,
said other first data and said translated second textual
data;
h) using said computer encoded card to board
transport carriers to said visited country;
i) using said computer encoded card to enter said
visited country in conjunction with a valid passport;
j) validating said visitor by collecting second
biometric data using a third computer, said validating
comprising transferring said second biometric data to
said first database system and comparing said second
biometric data with said first biometric data stored in
said first database system and said first biometric data
stored in said computer encoded card;
k) instructing said visitor to check-in with a first
self-service computer terminal by a predetermined date,
said first self service computer terminal located in a
plurality of locations in said visited country;
l) connecting said self-service computer terminal to
said first database using a second communications
network;
m) using said computer encoded card to check-in with
said first self-service computer terminal;
n) accessing said first database system by said
self-service computer terminal, using said first unique
identifier, said first unique identifier read from said
computer encoded card;
o) validating said visitor by collecting third
biometric data using said first self-service computer
terminal, said validating comprising transferring said
third biometric data to said first database system and
comparing said third biometric data with said first
biometric data stored in said first database system and
said first biometric data stored in said computer
encoded card;
p) using said computer encoded card in said visited
country as a personal identity means.
11. The system of claim 10 wherein said watch-list
databases comprise undesirable persons selected from the
group consisting of said visited country law enforcement
databases, an originating country law enforcement databases,
an Interpol database, a multiplicity of intelligence
services databases and said visa issuing authority
databases.
12. The system of claim 10 wherein said second
communications network comprising a secure network, wherein
said secure network selected from the group consisting of
X.25, dedicated telecommunication lines, satellite VSAT
network and a virtual private network over the Internet.
13. The system of claim 10 wherein said means for collecting
said first textual data comprises a keyboard displayed on
said first self-service computer terminal screen in one of
said multiplicity of foreign languages, selected by said
visitor, said first self-service terminal computer screen
comprising a touch-screen input means.
14. A distributed immigration and non-immigration
visa issuing and validation system for a visitor's visa
application to visit, study or work in a visited country,
comprising the steps of:
a) collecting first biometric data and additional
first data from said visitor with a first computer by a
visa issuing authority in a foreign country;
b) said first data collected in a language selected
by said visitor from a multiplicity of foreign languages
used to communicate with said first computer and
translated into a common language used by said visited
country by said first computer, said translated language
data are translated second data;
c) transferring said first biometric data, additional
first data and said translated second data from said
first computer to a second computer using a first
communications network, said second computer comprising
a first database system, said first database system
residing in said visited country;
d) storing said first biometric data, said additional
first data and said translated second data in said first
database system;
e) validating said first biometric data using a
multiplicity of watch-list databases;
f) validating said other first data and said
translated second data;
g) issuing a computer encoded card to said visitor,
provided said validating steps are approved by said visa
issuing authority, said computer encoded card comprising
a first unique identifier, said first biometric data,
said other first data and said translated second data;
h) using said computer encoded card to enter said
visited country;
i) validating said visitor by collecting second
biometric data using a fourth computer, said fourth
computer comprising a mobile computer operated by a
visited country immigration official whilst said visitor
is waiting in an immigration entry queue;
j) reading said first biometric data, said other
first data and said translated second data from said
computer encoded card by said fourth computer,
k) said validating comprising transferring said
second biometric data, said additional first data and
said translated second data to said first database
system and comparing said second biometric data with
said first biometric data, said other first data and
said translated second data stored in said first
database system and said first biometric data, said
additional first data stored and said translated second
data in said computer encoded card;
l) using said computer encoded card in said visited
country as a personal identity means.
15. The system of claim 14 wherein said mobile computer
is connected to said first database system using a secure
wireless network, wherein said wireless network selected
from the group consisting of Bluetooth, IEEE 802.16, IEEE
802.11, IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 802.11d and WCDMA.
16. The system of claim 14 wherein said first communications
network comprising a secure network, wherein said secure
network selected from the group consisting of X.25,
dedicated telecommunication lines, satellite VSAT network
and a virtual private network over the Internet.
17.
The system of claim 14 wherein said first biometric data,
said first textual data and said translated second data
stored in said first database system is accessed using said
first unique identifier.
18. The system of claim 14 wherein said first
computer selected from the group consisting of a computer
terminal, a personal computer and a self-service computer
kiosk.
19. The system of claim 14 wherein said first
database system residing in said visited country.
20. The system of claim 14 wherein said computer
encoded card selected from the group consisting of a
smartcard and a laser card.
Drawings
Select the following links to
view the associated figures:
Description
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
This is a continuation-in-part of
U.S.
application Ser. No. 10/771,008, filed on Feb. 4, 2004.
TECHNICAL FIELD
This invention relates to computer service kiosks
and computer encoded cards, specifically, this invention
relates to a country's consulate's or embassy's service
kiosk that is used to question and gather information from a
person who is requesting a visa to enter and visit the said
country. The issued visa is encapsulated in a smartcard.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Since the tragedy of Sep. 11, 2001 (9/11), the US
has been revising its methods and systems for issuing visas
to foreign visitors. Newspapers have reported that a number
of the 9/11 hijackers entered the US on fraudulent visas ("
Some
9/11 Hijackers Got Into the U.S. With Fraudulent Visas",
AP, Jan. 26, 2004). Furthermore, even prior to 9/11, theft
and fraudulent use of passports were common. The US has
tackled this problem in a number of ways, which are now
briefly discussed.
After 9/11, the US Congress
imposed a deadline of Oct. 26, 2004 for 27 industrialized
countries to issue computer-coded passports for their
citizens wishing to travel to the United States. This
requirement is problematic in that the solution relies on
other nations, rather than being under the control of the
US. This invention addresses this issue in conjunction with
the requirement of computer-coded travel documents.
In January 2004, the
US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented a new system at
115 airports and 14 seaports, which is designed to confirm
the identity of arriving foreign visitors. The new system is
called the
US-VISIT program, i.e. the United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology. Further information
on the US-VISIT program can be found at
www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVisitRegulation1-5-04.pdf
Today the primary focus of US-VISIT is on entry. By
the end of 2005, it is planned that entrance and exit
procedures will be phased in at all border entrances in the
US. Currently 30 airports implement the exit portion of the
program.
The US-VISIT uses scanning equipment to
collect biometric identifiers, specifically digital
fingerprints and digital photos of a person's face.
Data collected from foreign visitors is securely stored as
part of a visitor's travel record. Upon exiting the US,
visitors check out at kiosks by scanning their passport or
visa and repeating the fingerprint scan.
The stored information will be available to authorized
officials and law enforcement agencies and will help verify
compliance with visa and immigration policies. The
information, e.g. the scanned fingerprints, will be checked
against a database of known and suspected terrorists and
other undesirables.
Two other existing US visitor
systems are currently in place that use optical memory-based
cards. The first system is the
US Permanent Resident Card system. The second system is
the
Border Crossing Card system implemented by the
Department
of State. These systems do not use a computer kiosk to
issue and verify the optical cards, as the present invention
teaches.
A potential problem arises when a visitor
overstays his visa. An article titled "
Criminal
aliens at large a `crisis`" (The Washington Times,
Feb. 11, 2004) highlights the problem and consequences of
criminal visitors disappearing in the US, after deportation
orders were initiated. The common global phenomenon of
terrorist sleeper cells is another consequence of this
problem.
In the current system, this overstay will
be caught if he exits the country. It is possible that a
warrant for visitor's arrest could be issued because the
central database has detected a visitor's overstay. The
problem is then locating the individual. The majority of
visitor visas are issued for a period of six months. Within
six months, it is possible for a visitor to fraudulently
change his identity. The invention proposes to close many of
these loop holes.
SUMMARY
OF THE INVENTION
The invention integrates with a country's
foreign visitor visa issuing system and process that is
primarily the domain of the country's consular affairs.
Visas are applied for and issued in foreign countries at
various consulates and at the embassy of the issuing
country.
The issuance of electronic visas includes:
The
visa's applicant using a computer kiosk at the country's
overseas consulate.
The computer kiosk gathers all
pertinent data from the applicant in the applicant's
language and translates the responses into standardized
English for US authorities.
Data gathered includes the applicant's biometrics, such
as a digital passport-type photo, fingerprints and other
biometrics that may be required, e.g. a retina scan, etc.
The applicant's pertinent entered data is verified and
checked against various Watch-lists, e.g. criminal and
terrorist undesirables.
Storing an original copy of
the visitor's immigration (or non-immigration) information
in a central, secure database system--information, which is
to be embedded in the visitor's issued computer encoded card
(i.e. a visitor visa card), provided a visa is granted.
Once the applicant's data has been verified, an electronic
visa is issued at the consulate in the form of a visitor
visa card, in which pertinent immigration information is
embedded.
Use of cryptographic technology with the
visitor visa card is used to reduce fraud and other misuse.
The applicant is notified to collect her visitor visa card
visa at the consulate.
Prior to boarding an
aircraft, ship, etc., the visitor's visitor visa card visa
is scanned by pertinent authorities to verify its integrity
and association with the holder.
A self-service,
automated kiosk/terminal, i.e. a Visitor-Visa Automated
Teller Machine (ATM)/Kiosk with which the visitor interacts
(i.e. checks in) at her issuing consulate/embassy,
Port-of-Entry, Port-of-Exit, etc. The kiosk is also
distributed at various locations within the country.
Secure integration of an ATM terminal/computer kiosk with
the customs and immigration database.
The visitor's
check-in periodicity depends upon visitor's visa type and
length of stay in the country.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE
DRAWINGS
FIG. 1A
is a block diagram of the various components of the present
invention's embodiment of a Visitor-Visa Automated Teller
Machine/Self-Service Kiosk which is located at various
consulates around the world.
FIG. 1B
is a block diagram of the various components of the present
invention's embodiment of a Visitor-Visa Automated Teller
Machine/Self-Service Kiosk which is located at various
locations in-country, including Port-of-Entry and
Port-of-Exit.
FIG. 2 is
a flow chart of the various processes embodied by the
present invention.
FIG. 3A
is a schematic of the front face of the invention's computer
encoded visa card, i.e. the Visitor-Visa card.
FIG. 3B
is a schematic of the rear face of the invention's computer
encoded visa card, i.e. the Visitor-Visa card.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Below is a
table of contents, listing the various major sections of the
detailed description of the invention.
Before continuing to describe the invention in more
detail, we first consider a quick overview of available
cryptography.
1.0) Cryptography
for Verification, Integrity and Confidentiality
Two key cryptographic technologies that the preferred
embodiment of the invention uses are public key and
conventional cryptography to ensure three things:
(1.1) To verify the integrity of the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1,
(1.2) Confidentiality of the data transmitted between the
Kiosk 1 and the Central Database 2 and
(1.3) That
the data has not been altered during either transmission
between the Kiosk 1 and the Central Database 2, as well as
not being altered whilst stored on the Visitor-Visa card
400.
Conventional cryptography is also called secret
key or symmetric key cryptography. The
Data Encryption Standard (DES),
Triple Des and
Message Digest 5 (MD 5) are examples of
symmetric key cryptography.
Message digests are the representation of
alphanumeric text in the form of a single string of digits,
created using a one-way hash function. Encrypting a message
digest with a private key creates a digital signature, which
is an electronic means of authentication.
Use of
secret keys to encrypt data is much faster than public key
encryption, but the problem of using symmetric keys is the
safe distribution of the keys between transaction partners,
e.g. from a central office to remote offices where the
Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 is stationed. This key distribution is
solved using public key cryptography.
Public key cryptography is an asymmetric method that
uses a pair of keys for encryption: a public key that
encrypts data and a private key (i.e. secret key) that
decrypts the data. The public key is openly distributed. The
key's owner keeps the private key secret. The secret key
cannot readily be derived from the public key. Furthermore,
if the key owner digitally signed the data using his private
key, then the signature can be verified using the key
owner's openly distributed public key.
The present
invention uses cryptography to digitally sign the
information stored on the Visitor-Visa card 400. Public key
cryptography (i.e. Public Key Infrastructure or PKI) is used
to communicate between a central office and the remotely
located Kiosk 1 machines.
A Digital Certificate is
an attachment to an electronic message used for security
purposes. The most common use of a digital certificate is to
verify that a user sending a message is who she claims to
be, and to provide the receiver with the means to encode a
reply. An individual wishing to send an encrypted message
applies for a digital certificate from a
Certificate Authority (CA). The CA issues an encrypted
digital certificate containing the applicant's public key
and a variety of other identification information. Note that
in the preferred embodiment of the invention, the CA would
most probably be an issuing authority within the government.
The CA, in the preferred embodiment of the invention, makes
its own public key readily available via distribution on a
secure network. The recipient of an encrypted message uses
the CA's public key to decode the digital certificate
attached to the message, verifies it as issued by the CA and
then obtains the sender's public key and identification
information held within the certificate. With this
information, the recipient can send an encrypted reply. The
most widely used standard for digital certificates is
X.509.
Various implementations of cryptography are used in
the invention's preferred embodiment, such as Netscape's
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), the
IETF's
OpenPGP,
the
Message Digest 5 (MD5), etc.
Note that because
this invention would be used by the government, any
cryptographic standards that the government uses would be
implemented in the invention. In the US, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology lists government
standards for smartcards on a web site at
smartcard.nist.gov.
The Government Smart Card-Interoperability Specification is
freely available from this web as the "NIST
Interagency Report 6887-2003 edition Version 2.1".
The invention's embodiment relies on cryptography as
described in further detail in the book titled "Applied
Cryptography" (second edition), by Bruce
Schneier.
We now consider the various hardware components of
the invention before we discuss the process of the invention
and its use of various components.
2.0) Visitor-Visa Card
The present
invention includes the creation of an electronic visa card,
which incorporates an identity card, i.e. the Visitor-Visa
card 400 (see
FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B).
FIG. 3A depicts the front view of the Visitor-Visa
card 400. This card 400 becomes an ID card, as well as a
computer-encoded visa for the visitor during the visitor's
in-country stay. Furthermore, the card 400 can be used as an
official identification document by airlines, hotels, banks,
etc. The card 400 includes the following features:
(2.1) The card's physical format is similar to a credit card
issued by various banks, etc. The primary reason for this is
so that it can fit easily in a visitor's purse, wallet, etc.
Furthermore, the person is more likely to securely store the
card 400, whilst it's in his possession.
(2.2) A unique identification number 403 is
embossed, or printed on the front of the card 400 (see FIG.
3A), as well as on the rear of the card (see FIG. 3B). This
card identification number 403 is associated with the
visitor's database 2 record. Technically, it is set up as an
alternate database record key, i.e. the visitor's database
record can be accessed directly by using this identifier
403.
(2.3) A card logo 402 is present on the front
face of the card to provide easy identification of the card
type, i.e. versus a person's credit card, etc. This logo can
also be implemented as an anti-fraud measure, e.g. using a
hologram picture, etc.
(2.4) Further card type
identification information is provided on the card 400,
namely specific card type text 404. In FIG. 3A, the example
given is "US-VISIT CARD ID". This information is available
on both sides of the card 400. This information can be
embossed, or printed on the card 400. Other visual card type
indicators include the representation of the issued visa
type, i.e. US B1, B2, H1, H2, J1, J2, etc. This visual
indicator can be, for example, by using color encoding of
the card, or simply text printed on the card face 400.
(2.5) If the visitor requires assistance, e.g. locating a
Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 machine (more about this later) as
depicted in the "Locate Visitor-Visa Kiosk in City", block
22 in FIG. 2, the visitor can call the number listed on the
Help line 405, which is listed on the front of the card 400.
(2.6) A preferred embodiment of the invention includes a
smart integrated circuit, i.e. a smart-chip 401 on the card
400. This smart-chip 401 is similar to the technology used
in today's smartcards. An example of a smartcard is the
ASECard Crypto from Athena. This smartcard provides
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) encryption technology to
data stored on the card.
The invention uses the
smart-chip 401 to store information about the visitor, using
encryption technology to reduce the potential for fraudulent
abuse of the card 400. The ASECard Crypto has up to 3 KB of
non-volatile RAM to store information. As is common with
integrated circuit technology, the size of memory will
increase over time, and hence more data will be able to be
stored in the smart-chip's memory.
Other electronic
card technologies could as easily be used by the invention.
An example of such a technology is the optical laser card,
e.g. the
Drexler Technology Corporation's Lasercard. The
advantage to using an optical laser card is that it can hold
a larger amount of data, e.g. two megabytes. Optical laser
cards are used today in frequent US border crossings on the
Mexican border. The security measures embedded in smartcards
is preferable in the preferred embodiment of the invention,
but the invention does not rule out the use of optical laser
cards, or any other available, portable digital data storage
technologies.
(2.7) The visitor's photo 408 is printed directly
onto the front face of the card 400.
(2.8) Use of
the smart-chip 401 on the card 400 could be replaced by
using a magnetic stripe 406, for example, on the rear face
of the card (see FIG. 3B),
as is used by today's credit cards, etc. Standard technology
on today's magnetic stripe cards has three tracks on which
data can be encoded. The first track allows seventy-nine
(79) alphanumeric characters to be encoded, the second track
allows forty (40) numeric characters to be encoded, and the
third track allows one hundred and seven (107) numeric
characters to be encoded. As can be seen, the smart-chip 401
allows more data storage on the card 400 than a magnetic
strip 406. Note that in the use of an optical laser card,
pertinent memory is used.
(2.9) The rear face of the
card 400 (see FIG. 3B) also includes information 407 that
can be used to return the card 400 if it is lost by a
visitor and found by another person.
3.0) Visitor-Visa Automated Teller Machine (Kiosk)
FIG. 1A and
FIG. 1B
depict block diagrams of the various components of the
invention's Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1. The difference between
FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B is that FIG. 1A is used in the various
consulates, and other officially authorized visa issuing
stations, to issue a Visitor-Visa card 400, whereas FIG. 1B
represents the Kiosks used in-country to verify the
visitor's visa status, at Port-of-Entry, Port-of-Exit and at
various other locations throughout the visited country.
The primary difference is the fact that the
embassy/consulate's Kiosk in FIG. 1A requires a Visitor-Visa
card dispenser 7a, whereas the Kiosk in FIG. 1B simply
requires a Visitor-Visa card scanner (reader) 7b. It is
obviously possible to have the Kiosk in FIG. 1B having the
means to generate a smartcard as well. For descriptive
purposes, this distinction is kept in the description of the
invention.
The Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 is similar, for
example to the various ATMs that banks provide their
customers. The invention's Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1, includes
the following components:
(3.1) A digital camera 3
that is used to verify the identity of the person using the
Kiosk machine 1. The resolution (i.e. dpi) of this camera 3
is similar to the resolution of the digital camera used to
photograph the visitor at the originating consulate. This is
important in order to compare the original digital image
with the Kiosk 1 captured digital image.
(3.2)
Memory 4 to store both programs that control the Kiosk 1, as
well as memory to process data received via the various
interfaces of the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1.
(3.3) A
digital fingerprint scanner (i.e. reader) 5 that is used to
scan in (i.e. read) the fingerprint to verify the identity
of the person using the Kiosk 1. The resolution (i.e. dpi)
of this fingerprint scanner 5 is similar to the resolution
of the digital fingerprint scanner used to scan the visitor
at the originating consulate/embassy. This is important in
order to compare the original digital image with the Kiosk 1
captured digital image. Note that if other forms of
biometrics (e.g. retina scans, DNA sampling, ear-photo ["To
Make a Quick I.D., Play It By Ear", Business Week,
p.92, Apr. 12, 2004], etc.) were used, then the relevant
biometric scanner would be incorporated into the Kiosk 1.
(3.4) A processing unit, i.e. a CPU 6 and associated
circuitry that controls all the various electronic
components of the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1. Note that the
Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 could simply be implemented as a
standard computer, e.g. a MS-Windows, or Linux PC, or any
other available computer system.
NCR's EasyPoint (TM) 41 self-service kiosk runs under
various Microsoft operating systems, including Windows (TM)
NT and XP.
(3.5) A card dispenser 7a in FIG. 1A is
present in the Kiosks at the various consulates, or other
official visa issuing stations. This component is used to
issue the Visitor-Visa card 400 to a valid visa applicant.
The card dispenser 7a component includes a physically secure
safe that holds the computer encoded cards for issue, i.e.
similar to a bank's ATM's cash dispenser. Physical security
of non-issued computer encoded cards is critical to
defending against potential fraudulent abuse.
For
Kiosks that are located in-country, a card scanner (i.e.
reader) 7b is part of the Kiosk rather than the dispenser
7a. The card scanner 7b scans (i.e. reads) the Visitor-Visa
card 400 that was initialized during the "Initialization At
Consulate" 19 process. The card scanner 7b is able to read
information stored in either the card's magnetic stripe 406,
and/or the card's smart-chip 401. If an optical lasercard,
or any other data storage technology is used, then the card
scanner 7b would be able to read the data stored in the
card's memory.
(3.6) A display unit 8 (e.g. a
computer screen) on which to display messages for the
visitor. The preferred embodiment of the invention uses a
touch-screen display. The display 8 is also used to display
an interactive keyboard if information is required to be
entered by the visitor. The display of a multitude of
language alphabets is relatively easy using such a
touch-screen keyboard.
Note that a physically,
separately installed keyboard could be part of the Kiosk 1,
but for a number of reasons this option is not used in the
invention. Two reasons opposed to using a physical,
mechanical keyboard include (a) it would be very difficult
to accommodate the various alphabets of the multitude of
global languages on a, e.g. PS/2 keyboard and (b) a physical
keyboard would increase the maintenance and potential
mechanical problems arising from such a device.
One
other note at this point is that the present invention does
not exclude the use of computerized audio, person-computer
interaction (i.e.
computer voice recognition technology), rather than a
visual menu system on the display 8 with the visa applicant
via the Kiosk 1.
(3.7) A network interface 9 is
provided so that the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 can interact over
a secure network 10 with the Central Database 2, as well as
other needed computer and communications systems. The secure
network 10 can be implemented as a private network (e.g. via
X.25, dedicated telecommunication lines, satellite
VSAT network, a wireless network, etc.), a
virtual private network over the Internet, etc.
(3.8) A printer 11 is available to print any messages,
directions, and other information on a piece of paper 12 for
the visitor to take away with her.
(3.9) A signature
capture terminal 13 is used to input an applicant's
signature that is required on all relevant documents. For
example, on the U.S. Department of State form DS-156, the
Nonimmigrant Visa Application form, an applicant's signature
is required. An example of a signature capture terminal is
the
Transaction Team (TM) 1500 from HHP.
These
signature capture terminals are common in today's point of
sales credit card transactions. Today signatures captured in
this manner are commonly accepted. Furthermore, the legality
of such signatures is clearly defined in the Uniform
Commercial Code Section 1-201(39).
Other components not shown in FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B
include a visible marker (e.g. markers in the shape of
footprints) on the ground, or elsewhere, on which the
visitor is to stand, etc. in order to be within the focal
length of the digital camera 3. Although not used in the
preferred embodiment, it is possible to include a component
in the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 that can electronically measure
the height and/or weight of the visitor and to process the
information accordingly.
Each Visitor-Visa Kiosk,
i.e. in FIG. 1A and in FIG. 1B has a unique Digital
Certificate embedded in its memory 4 (not depicted in FIG.
1). This certificate is used to uniquely identify the Kiosk
1, used in secure communications with the Central Database 2
(e.g. via SSL), as well as being used to encode any
information for transmission. The digital certificate is
used similarly as a digital certificate is used in
electronic commerce (e-commerce) on the Internet today. Note
that the present invention does not exclude other means for
uniquely identifying the Kiosk 1, e.g. using a computer
MAC address, etc.
Furthermore, the public-key that was used to issue
the Visitor-Visa card 400 at the consulate is stored in
memory 4 as well for in-country Kiosks (i.e. as in FIG. 1B).
This public-key (or set of public keys from various
consulates, each with their own unique public key) is used
to verify the digital signature stored on the Visitor-Visa
card 400.
4.0) Visitor-Visa
Process
We now consider the visitor visa card process
and system in more detail. The visa process starts with the
"Initialization At Consulate", block 19 in FIG. 2.
4.1) Initialization At
Consulate--Block 19 in FIG. 2
This initial step (i.e. visitor registration) in
the process includes the digital photographing and
fingerprinting, or other biometric information gathering of
the visitor. The information is gathered at the consulate in
the visitor's country of origin, using a computer Kiosk 1 (see
FIG. 1A). This information is stored 100 by each Kiosk 1
in a Central Database 2, which is remotely located from each
of the Kiosks. The Central Database 2 is securely networked
to each of the Kiosks. The Central Database 2 is controlled
by a server computer (not shown in diagrams), and a variety
of software running on the server.
Note that because
of the dispersed location of the issuing Kiosks around the
globe at various consulates, it may be necessary to
initially store the applicants' data locally within the
consulate before transmitting it to the Central Database 2,
i.e. store-and-forward computer technology processing. This
process is not depicted in the diagrams.
The visa
applicant is shown an available Kiosk 1 by a consulate
staff. The Kiosk 1 has markings (not illustrated in FIG. 1A
nor FIG. 1B) as to where the person needs to stand, or be
seated depending on the ergonomics of the Kiosk 1, in order
to appear correctly within the focal length of the
Visitor-Visa Kiosk's digital camera 3. The consulate staff
initially assists the applicant in the use of the Kiosk 1,
as well as initially selecting the applicant's language of
choice, in which all the displayed information on the
kiosk's screen 8 (display unit) will be communicated. It is
also the language in which the alphabet on the kiosk's
touch-screen keyboard is displayed. This language preference
is stored in the Kiosk's Memory 4 as part of the visa
applicant's record.
The CPU 6l retrieves the
relevant language menus that are pre-stored in the Kiosk's
memory 4. The reason for this is obvious, i.e. to minimize
any potential communications problems with the visitor
regarding any conveyed instructions, etc. Note that it is
possible for the invention to simply store in memory 4, say
the English menu system, and then to programmatically
translate to the visitor's preferred language. The preferred
embodiment of the invention uses the simpler method of
pre-storing menus in all of the accepted foreign languages.
This reduces the need and expense for today's relatively
sophisticated language translation software to be embedded
in the Kiosk 1.
The first thing that the Kiosk 1 does is to collect
the applicant's biometric data, e.g. via the kiosk's Digital
Camera 3 and Digital Fingerprint Scanner 5. All information
gathered from the visa applicant is temporarily stored in
the kiosk's Memory 4 as part of the applicant's record. The
first message to appear on the Kiosk's display 8 is for the
visitor to remove any headgear, sunglasses, etc. that could
interfere with the facial identification of the person.
Next, the person is informed that a photo will be taken.
Preferably, a countdown indicator is displayed on the
display 8 informing the visitor of the imminent photo
taking.
After the digital photo has been taken, the
visitor is prompted via the Kiosk's display 8 to place his
pertinent finger on the surface of the digital fingerprint
scanner 5. His fingerprint is digitally scanned in and
temporarily stored in memory 4. Other biometric information
is collected at this stage, provided, that such biometrics
are part of the personal validation process.
The
date and time of the transaction, as well as the
identification number of the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 is
recorded in Memory 4 as part of the applicant's record.
Amongst the various reasons for this step is for auditing
purposes.
The visa applicant is then prompted on the
display unit 8 to enter all pertinent data for his visa
application. Any data that are deemed imperative is a
required field on the data entry system of the Kiosk 1. If
the applicant refuses, or cannot enter the required data, a
number of actions take place. Firstly, the applicant is
prompted whether they need personal assistance. If this is
in the affirmative, then the consulate personnel are
notified that assistance is required by the applicant at a
specific Kiosk 1. On the other hand, if the applicant does
not have the required data in-hand, then they can elect to
suspend the visa application process and return at a later
date. Another option is simply for the applicant to abandon
the visa application and walk out of the consulate. In the
latter two options, the applicant's record in Memory 4 is
tagged with a pertinent reason code and the kiosk session is
terminated. At no point is the applicant allowed to continue
with the visa application unless the current required field
is satisfied. This simple, commonly available computer data
entry technique of using required fields, reduces the
possibility of an incomplete visa being issued to an
applicant.
If during a visa application, the
applicant needs to submit additional paperwork, then the
Kiosk 1 would communicate this requirement. The paperwork
could be submitted in a number of ways, for example:
(a) The Kiosk 1 could have a facility for the applicant to
submit the paperwork to in a supplied envelope, which is
appropriately labeled/tagged for tracking purposes.
(b) Alternatively, a consulate staff member is
called by the Kiosk 1 and collects the pertinent paperwork
from the applicant.
The applicant's record in memory
4 is accordingly updated, e.g. with the ID number of the
consulate staff who collected the paperwork, or with the
supplied envelope's tag identifier.
Once the visitor
has submitted all of his required information, the visitor's
temporary data record stored in the Kiosk's memory 4, is
sent to the Central Database 2, via a secure network 10. In
FIG. 2, this step in the process is identified as "Log Visit
in Central Database", block 101.
Depending upon the speed that the system can process
the verification of the applicant's data, the applicant may
have to be notified to return later whilst her application
is being processed. On the other hand, if the system is
highly responsive, then the visa applicant could wait at the
consulate whilst her application is being processed.
A program at the Central Database 2 then processes the
received visa applicant's information. A key part of the
processing is a check against criminal, terrorist and other
undesirable watch-list databases. These databases could
include those of Interpol, intelligence agencies, national
and local law enforcement, etc. It is also possible for the
watch-lists in the applicant's country to be checked. This
would assist countries in curbing criminals escaping being
brought to justice.
The next step in the visa
application process is similar to the later check-in
process, which is depicted in block 25 in FIG. 2, i.e. the
"All's Well?" symbol. The following scenarios are possible:
(4.1.a) If a problem is encountered, e.g., the visitor's
biometric, or other identification data is found in a
watch-list database, then a pertinent anomaly message is
returned to the consulate, which the applicant visited in
applying for the visa. The consulate staff would then take
appropriate action, e.g. direct the applicant to a personal
interview with a skilled consulate staff member. The
applicant's record in the Central Database 2 is tagged
accordingly, as well as with any other pertinent data, such
as the consulate's identifier, etc.
Another problem
that could be encountered could be that the applicant's data
is unsatisfactory, e.g. insufficient funds may be available
for the visitor's planned stay in the US., etc. In this
case, a message is communicated to the consulate. Once
again, the visitor's Central Database 2 record is tagged as
problematic, with the appropriate code, as well as any other
pertinent data. The consulate would then contact the
applicant to correct the problem.
(4.1.b) On the
other hand, it is possible that authorities have tagged the
visitor's pre-existing Central Database 2 record as "need to
apprehend". In this case, a message is communicated to the
consulate, and/or if a trusted relationship exists between
the US and the originating country, then the country's law
enforcement could be notified as well. Once again, the
visitor's Central Database 2 record is tagged as
problematic, with the appropriate code, as well as any other
pertinent data.
(4.1.c) For most visitors, no problems would be
encountered. The Central Database 2 visa application program
sends a message to the consulate to issue the applicant's
visa, i.e. in the form of a Visitor-Visa Card 400.
Other possible "All's Well?" scenarios could exist, and even
though they are not described here, they are not excluded
from the present invention.
Even though the
preferred embodiment of the invention does not specify the
following process, it nevertheless could be incorporated
into the system. This process relates to the pre-application
part of the visa application. Today an applicant must report
to the nearest embassy or consulate to apply for a visa. The
wait in line is generally very long. Even though the use of
multiple kiosks will speed up the process, data entry prior
to using a Kiosk 1 is briefly discussed. It is possible to
allow the visa applicant to apply via the Internet. This
step would allow the applicant to enter pertinent data, say
via a web site on the internet, preferably via secure
connection (e.g. using SSL). The applicant would then be
given a confirmation number, which she would then use when
applying at the consulate's Kiosk 1. The applicant still
needs to apply at a Kiosk 1 at an embassy or consulate. The
reason is primarily to gather biometric data from the
applicant, which for obvious reasons, is preferably done at
the consulate or embassy. The confirmation number that was
given to the applicant via the online web site is then
entered when continuing the process at a Kiosk 1. A great
amount of time would be saved by having most of the visa
application's data already entered into the system.
We now consider the case in which the applicant's visa has
been granted. The purpose of the Visitor-Visa Card 400 is
similar to the use of a state driver's license in the US,
i.e. a means of personal identification. Today the visitor
primarily has his passport as a means of identification when
visiting a foreign country.
In the preferred
embodiment of the invention, the visitor's photo 408 is
directly printed onto the front face of the card 400. This
makes the card 400 representative of a foreign visitor's
in-country id document. Note that it is possible to embed
the visitor's date of entry (see Table 1, item [2]) in the
photo. This feature would help simplify the visual
validation of the visitor's authorized stay in the country.
Table 1 illustrates the type of data stored on this card
400, when using the smart-chip 401, or other technology that
can store a large amount of data, such as a lasercard. This
information is also stored (see "Log Visit in Central
Database", block 100 in FIG. 2, via the on-page connector
"60") in the Central Database 2.
| 1) |
Last Name, Middle Initial[s],
First Name |
Visitor's full name. |
| 2) |
Date of Entry Date |
(e.g., MM/DD/YY) on which the card was created
and issued at the overseas consulate. |
| 3) |
Visitor-Visa Card Number |
This unique identification number 403 is
embossed on the front of the card 400, as well as on
the rear of the card (see FIG. 3B). This card
identification number 403 is associated with the
visitor's database 2 record. This number is also
stored on the card's smart-chip 401 memory and/or
magnetic stripe 406. |
| 4) |
Length of Stay |
Authorized length of stay in country. For
example, a B2 visa could have a six-month stay. |
| 5) |
Visa Type |
Visa classification, e.g. B2, H1-B, J1, M1, etc.
This data could be encrypted to be used only by
authorized personnel. |
| 6) |
Digital Photo |
Copy of digital photo. |
| 7) |
Height |
Self-explanatory. |
| 8) |
Color of Eyes |
Self-explanatory. |
| 9) |
Color of Hair |
Self-explanatory. |
| 10) |
Language(s) |
Visitor's language of preference, as well as
others that the visitor understands. This language
will be used on the display unit 8 of the Kiosk 1
when the visitor interacts. |
| 11) |
Other Data |
Other data needed for the visa checking process,
e.g. issuing consulate code, Country of Origin,
Residential Address, Residential Phone Number,
visitor's weight, Passport #, Occupation, Signature,
etc. |
| 12) |
Digital Fingerprint |
Copy of scanned digital (encrypted) fingerprint.
Encrypted to be used only by authorized personnel. |
| 13) |
Digital Signature |
Digital signature of the above information
(e.g., [1] to [11]) to prevent fraudulent change of
information. |
TABLE 1 -
Visitor's Information Description
Other information could also have been gathered at the
time of the visa application, e.g. the person's weight could
be entered by having the visitor unobtrusively be standing
on a weight scale when being fingerprinted, etc. This
information would be stored in the Central Database 2, i.e.
in Table 1, "Other Data". Other data that can be captured
includes any data that is needed on the various immigrant
(e.g. US forms
I-140,
I-485, etc.) and nonimmigrant (e.g. US forms
DS-156,
I-129, etc.) application forms.
Referring to
Table 1, some of the information is encrypted to prevent
unauthorized viewing of the specific information. The
invention does not prevent the encrypting of other, or all
of the information. The primary purpose of the card 400 is
for use of the identification of the visitor, as well as
ensuring that the visitor does not overstay his visit in the
country.
One example of data that would be encrypted
for privacy, would be data that is voluntarily entered about
the applicant's health. For example, the applicant could
include data about her health, for example, she suffers from
diabetes, high blood pressure, allergies (e.g. to specific
medications, etc.), medications that the applicant needs,
etc. This data would be encrypted using a public key that
the relevant authorities would be able to decrypt and
extract from the card 400, e.g. Emergency Medical Teams,
hospitals, etc.
In the case where the smart-chip 401
is not used, e.g. because of implementation costs, etc.,
then the magnetic stripe 406 would be used. Unfortunately,
today the magnetic strip 406 cannot store all of the
information as described in Table 1 (see section "1]
Visitor-Visa Card", sub-section [1.7]). In this case, only
the Visitor-Visa Card Number (Table 1, item [3]) and the
Digital Signature (Table 1, item [12]) is stored in the
magnetic stripe 406. Note that the Digital Signature is
created at the consulate, or other official visa issuing
station, based on all of the pertinent information depicted
in Table 1, which could be stored in a smart-chip 401, if
one was used. Later for validation purposes, the Digital
Signature is centrally validated against the original data.
The actual location of where the card's data is gathered,
encrypted and digitally signed needs further explanation.
Bearing in mind that PKI cryptography is used in the
preferred embodiment of the invention, this means that
careful consideration needs to be given to the availability
of the visa issuing authorities private key.
The private key is used to encrypt data, as well as
to create the above-mentioned Digital Signature (see Table
1, item [13]). We now consider the following possible
implementations (where encryption implies both data
encryption, as well as creating the data's digital
signature) at the consulate--listed by decreasing risk of
potential abuse:
4.1.1) Encryption at each Kiosk 1
located in the consulate. This would require a copy of the
private key to be distributed to every Kiosk 1 in the
consulate. The risk for misuse is highest in this scenario.
Each Kiosk 1 would have to be sufficiently powerful enough
to handle the encryption process in a relatively short
period.
4.1.2) Encryption at a central computer
server located in each consulate, which serves the multiple
Kiosks in the consulate (see [4.1.1] above). This would
require a copy of the private key to be distributed to every
central computer server located in each consulate. The risk
for misuse is relatively high in this scenario, but much
lower than in case [4.1.1] above. The misuse risk can be
mitigated by strict control of access to the consulate's
central computer server. Furthermore, the consulate's
central computer server processing power would have to be
much larger than the above-mentioned scenario, because of
the aggregation of processing for multiple kiosks at the
consulate. Each Kiosk 1 would have to be securely networked
to the consulate's central computer server.
4.1.3)
Encryption at a central computer server located in each
region, i.e. country of the consulate service, which serves
multiple consulates (see [4.1.2] above). The obvious
location of such a computer would be at the country's
embassy. This would require a copy of the private key to be
distributed to every central computer server located in each
service region, i.e. country/embassy. The risk for misuse is
much lower in this scenario, than in both of the above cases
(see [4.1.1] and [4.1.2] above). The misuse risk can be
mitigated further by strict control of access to the
embassy's central computer server. The problem in this
scenario is that the card 400 data (i.e. Table 1) would have
to be sent to the embassy's central computer server for
encryption, etc. This would require a highly available and
secure communications network between the various consulates
and the embassy's central computer server. The embassy's
central computer server processing power would have to be
much larger than the above mentioned scenarios, because of
the aggregation of processing for multiple consulates.
4.1.4) Encryption at a central computer server located in a
single location of a country's consular affairs, which
serves multiple countries (see [4.1.3] above). For example,
this computer could be located within the embassies' home
country borders, e.g. for US embassies, the server could be
located in a Washington, D.C. facility. This would require a
single copy of the private key to be distributed on the
single central computer server. The risk for misuse is
lowest in this scenario, compared to all of the above cases.
The misuse risk can be mitigated further by strict control
of access to the single central computer server. The problem
in this scenario is that the card 400 data (i.e. Table 1)
would have to be sent to the single central computer server
for encryption, etc. from all of the Kiosks, from all over
the world. This would require a highly available; secure
communications network, and relatively large bandwidth,
between the various consulates around the world and the
single central computer server. Furthermore, the central
computer server's processing power would have to be much
larger than all of the above mentioned scenarios, because of
the aggregation of processing for all consulates. The single
central computer server could be a supercomputer, a
mainframe computer, or a cluster of mainframe computers, or
a cluster of mid-size computers, etc.
Note that the
problem of a reliable and secure network could be overcome
by using process and technology. One process solution would
be to collect all of the applicant visa data from the
multitude of consulates around a specific country, and then
have them sent to a central location, e.g. the country's
embassy, for transmission to the central computer.
Alternatively, technology such as VSAT satellite networking
could be used to connect the various consulates to the
embassy.
The preferred embodiment implements option
[4.1.3] above, i.e. encryption at a central computer server
located in each country (i.e. embassy, which serves multiple
consulates within a country). The card 400 data is
transferred to the country's central computer server,
pertinently encrypted and digitally signed (i.e. created in
"cryptographic state"), and then the data are returned in
the cryptographic state to the consulate's computer server
in order for a card 400 to be created and issued by one of
the consulate's Kiosks.
As soon as the applicant's
encrypted visa data is available at the consulate, i.e. the
applicant's visa has been granted, the applicant is
contacted by mail, telephone, etc. to stop by the consulate
and pick up his Visitor-Visa card 400, if this visa
verification process cannot be implemented in a relatively
short period, i.e. within a few hours.
The
Visitor-Visa applicant personally comes to the consulate to
collect the card 400. To collect the card 400, the applicant
again uses the Kiosk 1 in the consulate. This time, the
applicant has his biometrics re-entered into the system and
any other data such as his name, etc. The Kiosk's card
dispenser 7a then populates a card 400 with the approved
visa applicant's data. Once the card 400 has been created,
it is ejected from the Kiosk 1 and taken in hand by the
applicant. The applicant's database record in the Central
Database 2 is updated that a card 400 has been issued. The
Visitor-Visa card's unique identification number 403, date
and time of issue, place of issue, etc. is included in the
update transaction sent to the Central Database 2.
Note that the applicant could also collect the card 400 from
a staff member of the consulate, but for auditing purposes,
the preferred embodiment of the invention has the Kiosk 1
issuing the card 400 to the applicant.
Once the
Visitor-Visa Card 400 is ejected from the Kiosk 1, the
applicant can now travel to the US. If prior to traveling to
the US, the visitor loses his card 400, then he needs to
contact the consulate to initiate the "Losing a Visitor-Visa
Card" process (similar to the process described in section
4.3 below titled "Losing a Visitor-Visa Card").
An explanation is given to the visitor, e.g. via a
pamphlet, regarding the use and relevance of the card 400.
The US visitor now simply takes his Visitor-Visa card 400
with him, along with his passport, when he travels to the
USA.
Note that the Visitor-Visa card 400 can be used
by transport carriers, e.g. airlines, as verification of the
traveler prior to boarding the carrier. The various
verification methods described in section "4.5)
Check-In With Visitor-Visa Kiosk" (Block 23 in FIG. 2)
can be fully, or partially incorporated by the
transportation carriers. One of the key goals of the present
invention is to prevent the unauthorized travel of a US
bound visitor, at the earliest point in time and location.
4.2) Verification at Port-of-Entry--Block 20 in FIG.
2
On entering the US, the visitor proceeds
through the customs and immigration process. This process,
as embodied in the present invention, builds upon the
currently implemented US-VISIT system.
The addition
includes a form of the Kiosk 1, specifically as depicted in
FIG. 1B. This kiosk is preferably placed at each immigration
official's workstation. Consequently, the physical footprint
of this Kiosk would most likely be different from the Kiosks
used at the consulates. The key reason for this difference
is the physical space limitations at each immigration
official's workstation.
The Kiosk 1 has markings
(not illustrated in FIG. 1A nor FIG. 1B) as to where the
person needs to stand in order to appear correctly within
the focal length of the Visitor-Visa Kiosk's digital camera
3.
The visitor enters her card 400 into the Kiosk's
card scanner 7.
A quick note about data entry
errors. There have been numerous studies on the error rates
of people typing in computer data. In an online paper by
Panko (http://panko.cba.hawaii.edu/HumanErr/Basic.htm)
various human error rates under various contexts are
summarized. In one study by Grudin (1983), the error rate
per keystroke of professional typists was 1% per keystroke.
The Panko paper lists other data entry rates as well.
Consequently, it can be seen that the current invention's
use of minimizing data entry is advantageous.
The
data retrieved from the visitor's card 400 is temporarily
stored in the Kiosk's memory 4 for processing purposes, as
well as along with the date and time of the transaction, as
well as the geographic location of the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1.
Note that the geographic location of the Visitor-Visa Kiosk
1 could simply be implemented as a device id, which the
Central Database 2 then translates into the known geographic
location. Pertinent scanned card 400 information is
displayed on the immigration official's workstation computer
screen. This eliminates any possible data entry errors that
the official may introduce if the immigration official had
to type in the visitor's information.
The Kiosk's
CPU 6 next verifies that the visitor's card 400 has a valid
digital signature (see Table 1, item [13]). If the digital
signature is invalid, then the CPU 6 notes this information
as part of the temporarily stored data record of the visitor
in memory 4. The reason for this is that further validation
of the person's identity is required, i.e. via biometrics
such as a digital fingerprint scan and a digital photo. All
anomalies and the status of the various checks are displayed
on the immigration official's workstation computer screen.
Note that at no time does the invention forewarn the visitor
of any problems. The reason for this is not to alarm the
visitor before more data is gathered and/or the relevant
authorities are notified and have had time to act, etc.
The Kiosk 1 retrieves the language (See
Table 1, item [10]) in which the visitor prefers to
communicate. The CPU 6 retrieves the relevant language menus
that are pre-stored in the Kiosk's memory 4. The reason for
this is obvious, i.e. to minimize any potential
communications problems with the visitor regarding any
conveyed instructions, etc. Note that it is possible for the
invention to simply store in memory 4, say the English menu
system, and then to programmatically translate to the
visitor's preferred language. The preferred embodiment of
the invention uses the simpler method of pre-storing menus
in all of the accepted foreign languages. This reduces the
need and expense for today's relatively sophisticated
language translation software to be embedded in the Kiosk 1.
The first message to appear on the Kiosk's display 8 is for
the visitor to remove any headgear, sunglasses, etc. that
could interfere with the facial identification of the
person. Next, the person is informed that a photo will be
taken. Preferably, a countdown indicator is displayed on the
display 8 informing the visitor of the imminent photo
taking.
After the digital photo has been taken, the
visitor is prompted via the Kiosk's display 8 to place his
pertinent finger on the surface of the digital fingerprint
scanner 5. His fingerprint is digitally scanned in and
temporarily stored in memory 4. If other biometrics are used
in the personal identification of the visitor, then the
relevant data are gathered at this stage.
For the
casual visitor to the country, this would suffice for the
Kiosk check-in process. On the other hand, if the visitor is
say a student, then other information could be asked to be
verified by the visitor, for example, the visitor's current
residential address, place of study, etc. (i.e. in "Other
Data", Table 1). If any information
has changed, a touch-screen keyboard is displayed on the
display 8, and the visitor is prompted to enter the correct
information. Other examples of longer-term foreign visitors
are temporary workers, visiting academics, political
refugees, etc.
Once the visitor has submitted all of
his required information, the visitor's temporary data
record stored in the Kiosk's memory 4, is sent to the
Central Database 2, via a secure network 10. In FIG. 2, this
step in the process is identified as "Log Visit in Central
Database", block 101.
A program at the Central Database 2 then processes
the received information by comparing all the pertinent data
(see Table 1) with a copy of the visitor's identification
data (i.e. in Table 1), which was originally stored in the
Central Database 2 at the time that the visitor's card 400
was created and issued.
The next step in the
check-in process is depicted in block 25 in FIG. 2, i.e. the
"All's Well?" symbol. The following scenarios are possible:
(4.2.a) If a problem is encountered, e.g., the visitor's
digital fingerprint does not match the original fingerprint
that was originally scanned in at the consulate, then a
pertinent anomaly message is returned to the Visitor-Visa
Kiosk 1 and/or to the immigration official's workstation
screen. The official then takes the appropriate action. The
visitor's Central Database 2 record is tagged as
problematic, with the appropriate code, as well as any other
pertinent data.
(4.2.b) On the other hand, it is
possible that authorities have tagged the visitor's Central
Database 2 record as "need to apprehend". In this case, a
message is communicated to the nearest law enforcement
authorities to proceed immediately to the location of
visitor's Kiosk 1 location, as well as to the immigration
official's workstation screen. Once again, the visitor's
Central Database 2 record is tagged as problematic, with the
appropriate code, as well as any other pertinent data.
(4.2.c) For most visitors, no problems would be
encountered. The Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 would then calculate
when the visitor next needs to check in, provided he does
not leave the country prior to the calculated date. As
mentioned previously above, this information is displayed to
the visitor on the display unit 8, and if a printer 11 is
available, a note 12 is printed for the visitor in his
preferred language (see Table 1, item [10]). The visitor
then proceeds to customs prior to entering the country.
Other possible "All's Well?" scenarios could exist, and
even though they are not described here, they are not
excluded from the present invention.
Once the
visitor has been cleared by the customs and immigration
officials, he enters the country with his Visitor-Visa Card
400 in-hand. An explanation is given to the visitor, e.g.
via a pamphlet, preferably in the language that the visitor
understands, regarding the use and relevance of the card
400.
Before proceeding with the preferred embodiment
of the invention, a note is made of one alternate
implementation of the invention. This implementation
addresses the situation in which long waiting lines of
visitors are present to pass through the customs and
immigration process at a Port-of-Entry. A mobile Kiosk 1
(not depicted in any diagram) is used to gather initial data
from each visitor whilst waiting in line. This mobile Kiosk
1 would be mounted on, for example, a wheeled cart, which an
immigration official handles. Another implementation of the
mobile Kiosk 1 could be a hand-held device. The [mobile]
immigration official approaches various visitors waiting in
line and has them enter their Visitor-Visa card 400,
collects visitor biometrics, etc. In other words, this step
is similar to the visitor verification process described
above in this section. The collected visitor's data is
transmitted securely, for example wirelessly (e.g. using
existing technologies such as
WiFi
(TM),
Bluetooth
(TM),
WiMax/802.16,
WCDMA,
UMTS,
SDR,
802.11, 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11d, etc.), to a computer
server for further processing and verification. When the
pre-processed visitor reaches an immigration official's
workstation, the visitor scans her card 400 in order to pull
up her pre-processed record which was collected via the
mobile Kiosk 1 and processed/stored in the computer server.
The normal visitor verification would then continue, i.e.
current visitor biometrics have already been entered and
verified in the pre-processing stage. This process could be
used as well at land border crossings, i.e. at land-ports,
but rather officials would approach motor vehicles and their
occupants waiting in line.
4.3) Losing a Visitor-Visa Card
If the card 400 is lost, then the visitor must
immediately report its loss and go to the nearest
immigration office to generate a new card 400. In this
process, the visitor would have to pay for a new card 400.
At the time that the loss is reported, the Central Database
2 would be updated that the card 400 is no longer valid,
i.e. the Visitor-Visa Card Number 403 is invalid and the
visitor is scheduled to obtain a new card 400.
The
visitor would be photographed and fingerprinted again, as he
originally was at the consulate (block 19 in FIG. 2). The
visitor's new digital photo and fingerprint images are first
compared with those stored in the Central Database 2, that
were inputted during the process of "Initialization At
Consulate" (block 19 in FIG. 2). If the images match, then a
new card 400 is generated for the visitor and his Central
Database 2 record is updated. Note that the originally
issued card's identification data remains in the Central
Database 2, but is tagged as "lost". The reason for this is
in the advent that the stolen card is fraudulently used, it
can be detected and the miscreant apprehended. If the card
400 is returned, the database 2 is updated, but a record is
still kept of the card 400 theft in case fraudulent use is
made of the data on the card 400. Sometimes it may be
feasible to simply retire the stolen card 400 from
circulation, even if it is returned to authorities.
4.4) Time To Check-in Block 21 in FIG. 2
At some predetermined time interval, e.g. every
three months or six months, etc. from the date of arrival in
the country, the visitor must check-in at a local
immigration office, or at a place, that has a Visitor-Visa
Kiosk 1 available. The visitor can use the phone contact
information 405 that is printed on the front face of the
card 400 to locate where the nearest Kiosk 1 is located.
Although not illustrated, the preferred embodiment of the
invention uses a common telecommunications technique, which
is based on a telephone 's caller-id. The number that the
visitor dials, per the contact phone number 405, is
implemented using an
Interactive Voice Response (IVR)
computer system. Firstly, the visitor is prompted to enter
his card identification number 403 using the keypad on the
phone. These instructions are printed on the pamphlet that
was given to the visitor at her Port-of-Entry (see section
[4.2] above). The number 403 is used to access the Central
Database 2 to find out what is the visitor's preferred
language, or languages. This language is then used to issue
all further instructions, etc.
The IVR computer
recognizes from where the call is placed, and if the
appropriate menu option is selected (e.g. "Where is the
nearest Kiosk location?"), the system tells the visitor
where the nearest Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 is located.
The preferred embodiment provides this information via the
Internet as well (e.g. on a web site, which is not
illustrated). This step in the process is illustrated by the
"Locate Visitor-Visa Kiosk in City", block 22 in
FIG. 2.
Note that it is preferable for the Kiosk 1 to be in
a secure location to prevent vandalism and other abuses of
the system. Examples of such locations are as follows (see
Table 2):
| 1) |
Local government offices, e.g. immigration
office, post offices, etc. |
| 2) |
Select local police stations that are located in
public areas. |
| 3) |
College campus Registrar's office or campus
police stations. |
| 4) |
Airport locations, e.g. monitored by the US
Transportation Security Administration. |
| 5) |
Train stations, e.g. monitored by railway staff.
|
TABLE 2
Locations of In-Country Visitor-Visa Kiosks
The visitor then goes to the nearest Visitor-Visa
Kiosk 1 and takes his Visitor-Visa card 400 along with him.
Note that at this stage the visitor does not need his
passport and hence can leave it stored securely at his
hotel, etc.
4.5) Check-in With
Visitor-Visa Kiosk--Block 23 in FIG. 2
Before
continuing with the detailed description of this step in the
process, a note needs to be made regarding the various data
storage implementation methods of the Visitor-Visa card 400,
as mentioned above in the section titled "4.1)
Initialization At Consulate". In this section, it was
mentioned that identification information about the visitor
(i.e. Table 1) is stored in a number
of technologies, i.e. a smart-chip 401 and/or a magnetic
stripe 406, or a laser-card. Because of the previously
mentioned physical data storage limitations of the magnetic
stripe 406, the preferred embodiment of the invention
implements data storage on the card 400 in a smart-chip 401.
On the other hand, if a smart-chip 401 implementation is not
used, then this information would be retrieved from the
Central Database 2. This is done by retrieving the visitor's
record in the Central Database 2, using the secure network
10 and the card identification number 403. This record
contains the original copy of all of the pertinent
identification information about the visitor that is listed
in Table 1.
After locating the nearest Visitor-Visa
Kiosk 1, the foreign visitor approaches the Kiosk 1 with his
Visitor-Visa Card 400 in-hand.
Note that the
Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 could be monitored by video cameras to
deter vandalism, etc.-- as bank ATMs are monitored today
4.5.1) Visitor-Visa Card Verification
The Kiosk 1 has markings (not illustrated in
FIG. 1A nor FIG. 1B) as to where the person needs to stand,
or be seated depending on the ergonomics of the Kiosk 1, in
order to appear correctly within the focal length of the
Visitor-Visa Kiosk's digital camera 3.
The person
enters her card 400 into the Kiosk's card scanner 7.
The data retrieved from the visitor's card 400 is
temporarily stored in the Kiosk's memory 4 for processing
purposes, as well as along with the date and time of the
transaction, as well as the geographic location of the
Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1. Note that the geographic location of
the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 could simply be implemented as a
device id, which the Central Database 2 then translates into
the known geographic location.
The Kiosk's CPU 6
next verifies that the visitor's card 400 has a valid
digital signature (see Table 1, item [13]). If the digital
signature is invalid, then the CPU 6 notes this information
as part of the temporarily stored data record of the visitor
in memory 4. The reason for this is that further validation
of the person's identity is required, i.e. via biometrics
such as a digital fingerprint scan and a digital photo.
Note that at no time does the invention forewarn the visitor
of any problems. The reason for this is not to alarm the
visitor before more data is gathered, etc.
The Kiosk
1 retrieves the language (See Table 1,
item [10]) in which the visitor prefers to communicate. The
CPU 6 retrieves the relevant language menus that are
pre-stored in the Kiosk's memory 4. The reason for this is
obvious, i.e. to minimize any potential communications
problems with the visitor regarding any conveyed
instructions, etc. Note that it is possible for the
invention to simply store in memory 4, say the English menu
system, and then to programmatically translate to the
visitor's preferred language. The preferred embodiment of
the invention uses the simpler method of pre-storing menus
in all of the accepted foreign languages. This reduces the
need and expense for today's relatively sophisticated
language translation software to be embedded in the Kiosk 1.
The first message to appear on the Kiosk's display 8 is for
the visitor to remove any headgear, sunglasses, etc. that
could interfere with the facial identification of the
person. Next, the person is informed that a photo will be
taken. Preferably, a countdown indicator is displayed on the
display 8 informing the visitor of the imminent photo
taking.
After the digital photo has been taken, the
visitor is prompted via the Kiosk's display 8 to place his
pertinent finger on the surface of the digital fingerprint
scanner 5. His fingerprint is digitally scanned in and
temporarily stored in memory 4. If other forms of biometric
data are used, then it would be gathered by the Kiosk 1 at
this stage.
For the casual visitor to the country,
this would suffice for the check-in process. On the other
hand, if the visitor is say a student, then other
information could be asked to be verified by the visitor,
for example, the visitor's current residential address,
place of study, etc. (i.e. in "Other Data", Table 1). If any
information has changed, a touch-screen keyboard is
displayed on the display 8 using the visitor's preferred
language, and the visitor is prompted to enter the correct
information. Other examples of longer-term foreign visitors
are temporary workers, visiting academics, political
refugees, etc.
Once the visitor has submitted all of
his required information, the visitor's temporary data
record stored in the Kiosk's memory 4, is sent to the
Central Database 2, via a secure network 10. In
FIG. 2,
this step in the process is identified as "Log Visit in
Central Database", block 101.
A program at the Central Database 2 then processes
the received information by comparing all the pertinent data
(see Table 1) with a copy of the visitor's identification
data (i.e. in Table 1), which was
originally stored in the Central Database 2 at the time that
the visitor's card 400 was created and issued.
The
next step in the check-in process is depicted in block 25 in
FIG. 2, i.e. the "All's Well?" symbol. The following
scenarios are possible:
(4.5.1.a) If a problem is
encountered, e.g., the visitor's digital fingerprint does
not match the original fingerprint that was scanned in at
the consulate, then a pertinent anomaly message is returned
to the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1. The Kiosk 1 then informs the
visitor via the display unit 8 that he needs to visit, in
person, the nearest Customs and Immigration office within a
specified time-period. This step is depicted by the "Visit
Visitor-Visa Office", block 80 in FIG. 2. The Visitor-Visa
office location is displayed to the visitor on the display
8, and the Kiosk's integrated printer 11 prints the location
and the specified time-period out for the visitor on a piece
of paper 12. The visitor's Central Database 2 record is
tagged as problematic, with the appropriate code, as well as
any other pertinent data.
(4.5.1.b) On the other
hand, it is possible that authorities have tagged the
visitor's Central Database 2 record as "need to apprehend".
In this case, a message is communicated to the nearest law
enforcement authorities to proceed immediately to the
location of visitor's Kiosk 1 location. Another message code
is transmitted to the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 to stall the
person. The stall process could entail asking many other
seemingly related questions, as well as displaying other
information. Once again, the visitor's Central Database 2
record is tagged as problematic, with the appropriate code,
as well as any other pertinent data.
(4.5.1.c) For
most visitors, no problems would be encountered. The
Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1 would then calculate when the visitor
next needs to check in, provided he does not leave the
country prior to the calculated date. As mentioned
previously above, this information is displayed to the
visitor on the display unit 8, and if a printer 11 is
available, a note 12 is printed for the visitor in his
preferred language (see Table 1, item
[10]).
Other possible "All's Well?" scenarios could exist,
and even though they are not described here, they are not
excluded from the present invention.
4.6) Data Mining of the Central Database
The information stored in the Central Database 2, including
the check-in events of the foreign visitor, can be searched
(i.e. mined) by various authorized computer programs. We now
consider a number of these processes:
4.6.1) Check for Unusual
Behavior--Block 201 in FIG. 2:
A computer
program 201 runs constantly checking for unusual behavior
200 patterns in the data collected in the Central Database
2. Unusual behavior would simply imply searching for
anomalies such as fraudulent use of a particular
Visitor-Visa Card 400, or a visitor's overstay.
In the fraud case, it could be that a person simply
copied all the information from one card 400 to another
card. This behavior could be detected on a number of levels:
a. The same Visitor-Visa Card Number 403 is present
in the data storage memory of both Visitor-Visa cards.
b. The encrypted digital biometric images (e.g.
fingerprint and/or photo) that are stored in the Central
Database 2 are not the same as that captured at check-in
time by the Kiosk's digital camera 3, or digital fingerprint
scanner 5.
Common fraudulent document detection
methods would apply to this program 201, but are not
explicitly discussed here.
Other uses 300 (see FIG.
2) of the Central Database 2 by authorized parties include:
(4.6.2) Traffic Stop
If the visitor were
pulled over by police 301 (see
FIG. 2), say for speeding, then the police officer would
scan 399 the visitor's Visitor-Visa card 400 on equipment
supplied to the police authorities (not shown in FIG. 2).
The visitor's information would then be logged and checked
102 in the Central Database 2. If any anomaly is discovered,
or the visitor's Central Database 2 record has been tagged,
the police officer can take the appropriate action.
(4.6.3) Financial Transaction
Validation
The Visitor-Visa card 400 check-in process could
be modified and used in other circumstances during the
visitor's visit. For example, the card 400 can be scanned
whenever the visitor checks into a hotel, or rents a car, or
travels by rail, etc. (see block 302 in FIG. 2). Currently,
a valid ID document is required in these situations, hence
the requirement to use the Visitor-Visa card 400 would not
be exceptional.
Supplying this information could
help in various ways, including for routine crime reduction.
An example of routine crime reduction could be in the advent
that a visitor's wallet was stolen in which his credit cards
and identification documents were located. The visitor would
report the theft to the relevant authorities, including the
Visitor-Visa card 400 authorities (see above section
(4.3) titled "Losing a Visitor-Visa Card").
The thief would then have to use the Visitor-Visa card 400
whenever he'd use, e.g. a credit card within the country.
This process would need the possible process modification by
the credit card companies. For example, if a credit card is
used, and the credit card number belongs to an overseas
visitor (i.e. it was issued by an overseas bank), then the
visitor's Visitor-Visa card 400 would have to be scanned as
well, rather than simply having to display the card 400 as
identification.
4.7) Check Out
at Port-of-Exit--Block 110 in FIG. 2
When the visitor is ready to leave the country,
he needs to check-in one last time with a Visitor-Visa Kiosk
1. This time, the Kiosk 1 is located within the exit process
implemented by the country's customs and immigration
authorities, i.e. at the Port-of-Exit (i.e. at airports,
seaports and land-ports).
The check out process is
similar to that outlined in the above section (4.5) titled
"Check-in With Visitor-Visa Kiosk" (Block 23 in FIG. 2),
with the following exception: the visitor's card 400 is
"swallowed" by the Visitor-Visa Kiosk 1, i.e. it is not
returned to the visitor.
This card 400 "swallow"
process does not apply to certain visa types, i.e. types
that are authorized for long-term stay in the country and
have not overstayed permitted time in the country. In the
US, examples of these visa types include:
A visa--Diplomatic and other government officials, and
their families and employees.
G visa--Representatives to international organizations
and their families and employees.
J visas--Exchange Visitors and their families.
H-1B visas--Persons in a specialty occupation, which
requires the theoretical and practical application of a body
of highly specialized knowledge requiring completion of a
specific course of higher education.
L visas --Intra-company transferees who, within the
three preceding years, have been employed abroad
continuously for one year, and who will be employed by a
branch, parent, affiliate, or subsidiary of that same
employer in the U.S. in a managerial, executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity.
I-551--US permanent residents, i.e. "green card"
holders.
Numerous other immigrant and non-immigrant
visa classifications apply as well, but are not listed here.
The visitor's Central Database 2 record is updated
accordingly.
At check out, the visitor's Central
Database 2 record is checked for any anomalies before the
visitor is allowed to exit the country.
Once the
card 400 has been returned to the authorities at check out,
the visitor related data on the card 400 is erased and it is
now available to be reused with a new visitor entering the
country. On the other hand, it is as feasible to simply
safely discard the card 400.
In the case where the
card 400 is not "swallowed", on re-entry to the country, the
cardholder goes through a similar process as to the one
detailed in the section titled "Check-in With Visitor-Visa
Kiosk" (Block 23 in FIG. 2). The difference in this case is
that the check-in process is via the immigration authority
at a Port of Entry. The same validation tasks, as described
in section (4.2) titled "Verification at Port-of-Entry" are
undertaken to ensure that the cardholder is correctly listed
in the database 2.
* * * * *
